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INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the Trump Administration’s three Supreme Court
appointments, many onlookers—from legal scholars and commentators, to historically disadvantaged groups, to broader cross-sections
of the American public—expect that the retooled Court may now have
the votes to accelerate a long-awaited shift in jurisprudence that could
undermine a litany of current civil rights and equality protections.1 A
diversified portfolio of long-entrenched and newly secured rights
alike are seen by many as imperiled: reproductive rights, 2 LGBTQ
1. See Adam Liptak, New Justice Will Have Little Power to Thwart Supreme Court’s
Rightward
Lurch,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
27,
2022),
https://
www.nytimes.com/2022/01/27/us/politics/new-justice-supreme-court.html
[https://perma.cc/S52P-J66K] (“[T]here is no reason to think the new justice [replacing Justice Breyer, who announced his retirement on January 26, 2022] will be able to
slow the court’s accelerating drive to the right. . . . Facing no perceived headwinds, the
conservative majority seems ready to go for broke.”); Oliver Knox, Breyer’s Retirement
Won’t Change the Supreme Court’s Conservative Bent, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2022),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/01/26/trumps-mark
-supreme-court-could-soon-hand-conservatives-some-major-victories
[https://
perma.cc/NBL3-TBWP] (predicting “far-reaching” conservative victories in the future
despite the appointment of a new, left-leaning Justice to replace Stephen Breyer).
2. The Supreme Court recently heard arguments in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s
Health Organization, a case involving Mississippi’s law banning virtually all abortions
after fifteen weeks of gestation, with no exceptions in cases of rape or incest. Dobbs v.
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rights,3 race- and ethnicity-centered protections,4 voting rights,5 and

Jackson Women’s Health Org., 141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021) (granting writ of certiorari). The
case is widely noted as a potential occasion for the Court to overrule Roe. See, e.g., B.
Jessie Hill & Mae Kuykendall, Uprooting Roe, HOUS. L. REV. 50, 50 (2022) (“[T]he U.S.
Supreme Court is likely poised to overturn Roe . . . .”); Margaret Talbot, Amy Coney Barrett’s Long Game, NEW YORKER (Feb. 7, 2022), https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2022/02/14/amy-coney-barretts-long-game
[https://perma.cc/PD85
-S253] (“A majority of Americans want to keep abortion legal, but the Justices may well
overturn Roe anyway.”).
The Court also recently refused to block a Texas law banning abortions at approximately six weeks of pregnancy and delegating enforcement to private individuals
against anyone who “performs, aids, or abets an abortion after the detection of a fetal
heartbeat.” S. B. 8 § 3 (to be codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 171.201(1),
171.204(a), 171.208(a) (West 2021)). The law remains in effect while under challenge.
See Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494 (2021) (ruling that lawsuit by
abortion providers can proceed against state medical licensing officials but not statecourt judges and clerks and leaving the law in place while the lawsuit proceeds in the
lower courts).
3. The court narrowly avoided taking a firm position on religious-based objections to LGBTQ non-discrimination laws when it recently decided Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021). The Court unanimously held that the City of Philadelphia violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause by requiring Catholic Social
Services (CSS), a foster care agency in the City, to certify same-sex couples as foster
parents. Id. at 1882. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, found that the City’s
contract with CSS was not subject to deferential review under Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), because the contract provision outlining rejection of referrals was not generally applicable due to the City’s ability to grant exemptions to the
non-discrimination policy. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1878–79. Because the City offered no
compelling reason for denying an exception to CSS, the refusal to contract with CSS
constituted a violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 1882; see also Madeleine Carlisle
& Belinda Luscombe, Supreme Court Sides with Catholic Agency in LGBTQ Foster Care
Case–But Avoids Major Religious Freedom Questions, TIME (June 17, 2021),
https://time.com/6074119/supreme-court-foster-care-ruling-fulton-philadelphia
[https://perma.cc/KS5B-J5N5] (“[Fulton] reflects the importance of religious liberty
in this Supreme Court . . . [which] has a very consistent, steady stream of broadly construing religious freedom rights, even at the potential sacrifice of LGBTQ rights.” (second alteration in original)).
4. See Chiraag Bains, Amy Coney Barrett Could Bring Down Decades of Anti-Discrimination
Law,
SLATE
(Oct.
26,
2020),
https://slate.com/news-and
-politics/2020/10/barrett-supreme-court-race-discriminatory-laws.html [https://
perma.cc/8EUU-L9PH]; Into America, Into Amy Coney Barrett’s Record on Race, MSNBC
(Oct.
19,
2020),
https://www.msnbc.com/podcast/amy-coney-barrett-s
-record-race-n1243947 [https://perma.cc/HB6C-KE5L].
5. See Mondaire Jones, What Amy Coney Barrett Means for the Future of Voting
Rights, NATION (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/barrett
-voting-rights-act [https://perma.cc/2FW3-7XM3]; see also infra notes 370–87 and accompanying text (discussing, among other things, Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.,
141 S. Ct. 2321, 2370 (2021)).
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more. 6 The Court’s rapid rightward lurch has prompted these concerned observers to table any frustrations with the sluggish pace of
new, affirmative progress in favor of a more immediate fear that the
fruits of past equality efforts may soon be diminished. The concern, in
essence, is this: What rights might the new Court seek to unmake? And
what could possibly stop it?7
Of course, even prior to the appointments of Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, the Court’s inclination to enthusiastically enforce equality and related norms had long since receded from its Warren-era high-water mark.8 Throughout the Roberts era, substantive
6. See Knox, supra note 1 (predicting conservative victories in the Supreme
Court on a range of issues that include vaccine mandates, environmental protection,
affirmative action, and gun rights); see also Christina Coleburn, Roe May be the First
Domino to Fall in the Series of Fundamental Rights, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (Dec. 2, 2021),
https://harvardcrcl.org/roe-may-be-the-first-domino-to-fall-in-the-series-of
-fundamental-rights [https://perma.cc/5L94-YBWN]; Jordan S. Rubin, Ruling on ‘Gruesome’ Execution Case Exposes High Court Rifts, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 1, 2019)
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/ruling-on-gruesome-execution-case
-exposes-high-court-rifts-3 [https://perma.cc/7LUH-J6PE]; Lawrence O. Gostin,
Wendy E. Parmet & Sara Rosenbaum, The US Supreme Court’s Rulings on Large Businesses and Health Care Worker Vaccine Mandates: Ramifications for the COVID-19 Response and the Future of Federal Public Health Protection, 327 JAMA 713, 713 (2022)
(“The Court curtailed the government’s ability to respond to the [COVID-19] pandemic
and may have also severely limited the authority of federal agencies to issue health and
safety regulations.” (citing NFIB v. Dept. of Labor, 142 S. Ct. 661 (2022) (per curiam))).
7. From a different perspective, the Supreme Court has been, or appears poised
to become, more rights-protective on matters such as the First Amendment, property
rights, and economic due process. See, e.g., S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716 (2021) (invalidating an executive order by the governor of California limiting attendance at places of worship in order to stem the spread of the virus
that causes COVID-19); Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63
(2020) (striking down an executive order imposing occupancy restrictions on places
of worship to stem the spread of the virus that causes COVID-19); Cedar Point Nursery
v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 844 (2020) (granting certiorari to decide whether a regulation allowing union organizers to access agricultural growers’ property without notice constitutes a per se physical taking under the Fifth Amendment); see also Mila Sohoni, The
Trump Administration and the Law of the Lochner Era, 107 GEO. L.J. 1323, 1381–84
(2019) (noting how the Trump Administration’s embrace of economic due process can
be maximized by nominating judges to the federal judiciary); Leah Litman, A Conservative Judge Just Made It Even Harder to Stop Covid, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/09/17/conservative
-judge-just-made-it-even-harder-stop-covid [https://perma.cc/JJ7J-A33W] (noting a
Trump-appointed federal judge’s invocation of Lochner to invalidate an executive order in Pennsylvania requiring statewide business shutdowns).
8. See Burt Neuborne, The Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren Court, 2010
SUP. CT. REV. 59, 66 (noting that although the Warren Court’s constitutional jurisprudence systematically dismantled Jim Crow, “post-Warren Court constitutional doctrine
often turned back toward pre-Warren standards”); see also Michael Vitiello, Arnold
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Equal Protection arguments have routinely been met with judicial indifference. This was often the case (despite a few notable exceptions)9
during Justice Kennedy’s long tenure as the so-called median Justice10
and remained during Chief Justice Roberts’s brief stint as median Justice.11 There is no reason to believe it will cease to be the case with an
extra Justice slotted to the Chief’s right, creating a revolving “median
pool” from which, depending on the issue, Justices Kavanaugh, Gorsuch, or Barrett may emerge to supply any given swing vote. In fact,

Loewy, Ernesto Miranda, Earl Warren, and Donald Trump: Confessions and the Fifth
Amendment, 52 TEX. TECH L. REV. 63, 74 (2019) (arguing that the post-Warren “Court’s
case law has continued to chip away at the core protections” of criminal defendants’
Miranda rights); David A. Logan, Still Standing After All These Years: Five Decades of
Litigation Under the Fair Housing Act and the Supreme Court Still Can’t Say for Sure Who
Is Protected, 23 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 169, 200–01 (2018) (“[A]s the increasingly conservative justices on the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have had to decide
what to do with the liberal decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts, some say that
the result has been ‘stealth overruling.’”); cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword, Democracy
and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (2012) (“The Warren Court’s most consequential
decisions reflect the view that democracy requires a level of egalitarian inclusion, even
in the face of competing property rights.”).
9. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (granting foreign national
Guantanamo Bay detainees constitutional protections to challenge the legality of their
detention through habeas corpus proceedings despite a federal statute seeking to strip
habeas jurisdiction); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (invalidating under
the Fifth Amendment a provision of the Defense of Marriage Act restricting the federal
definition of the word “marriage” to different-sex couples only); Obergefell v. Hodges,
576 U.S. 644 (2015) (recognizing the right to marry for same-sex couples under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
10. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Why Liberals and Conservatives Flipped on Judicial Restraint: Judicial Review in the Cycles of Constitutional Time, 98 TEX. L. REV. 215, 254
(2019) (describing the late Rehnquist/early Roberts era as one in which “[t]he Supreme Court’s conservative majority . . . began to use judicial review energetically, to
protect the rights of states, commercial advertisers, and conservative Christians; to
limit liberal civil rights laws; and to strike down liberal affirmative-action programs
and campaign-finance regulations”); Justin Collings, The Supreme Court and the
Memory of Evil, 71 STAN. L. REV. 265 (2019) (lamenting the 5-4 decisions in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 and Shelby County v.
Holder—both of which Kennedy joined—as expressing a myopic view of history that
undermined long-standing commitments to equality); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.
Ct. 2392 (2018) (upholding the Trump Administration’s third rollout of a ban on foreign arrivals from largely Muslim-majority countries—Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea,
Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen).
11. Benjamin Pomerance, The King in His Court: Chief Justice John Roberts at the
Center, 83 ALB. L. REV. 169, 229 (2019) (“Equal protection and due process concerns
raised by minority groups rarely resonate with [Chief Justice Roberts], leading to a catalog of extreme skepticism from the Chief Justice in this area of focus.”); Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (holding that extreme partisan gerrymandering
claims presented political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts).
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there is very good reason to think just the opposite.12
Still, for all the current (and foreseeable future) Court’s apparent
disinclination toward substantive equality arguments, hope may not
be entirely lost for those seeking to preserve existing statutory and
constitutional rights from revocation. During prior periods of rightward drift, the Court has often invoked procedural or institutional reasons to freeze in place rights already secured by marginalized groups
through legislative, executive, or judicial processes. This is “non-retrogression,” a dynamic that supplies friction dissuading the Court
from reverting to what might otherwise be a perfectly lawful state of
affairs were it not for some kind of reliance on the current state of affairs.
Although, in recent years, concepts surrounding non-retrogression have been revisited and applied to contemporary rights litigation
with renewed enthusiasm,13 scholars have yet to probe more deeply,
or develop more broadly, a theoretical and doctrinal framework for
examining non-retrogression in the range of jurisprudential contexts
in which it arguably arises. This Article demonstrates that courts have
in fact embraced a much broader, more flexible non-retrogression
principle over the years to preserve the status quo where rights are
concerned. And, despite the view of some scholars that non-retrogression is nothing more than a shadow doctrine through which substantive goals masquerade as procedural principles,14 this Article argues
that courts absolutely do—and should—seize upon certain procedural and jurisprudential surrogates for substance as a bulwark to
rights rescission.
Non-retrogression documents an intersection of process and
substance that has gone unnoticed among legal scholars: one
grounded not in the rights invoked by plaintiffs, but rather in a judicial
concern with good procedure, orderliness, judicial manageability,
and, at times, a respect for the current state of constitutional culture,
12. See supra notes 2–6.
13. See, e.g., Craig J. Konnoth, Revoking Rights, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1365, 1412 (2015)
(noting that one such concept—vested rights—has “recently entered the constitutional mainstream in the marriage litigation context”); David A. Super, A New New
Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773, 1875 (2013) (“Recently . . . the Court has accepted
the principle that longstanding programs create reliance interests that Congress is not
free to disturb.”).
14. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Daryl J. Levinson, The Non-Retrogression Principle in Constitutional Law, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1211, 1235–37 (1988) (“Arguments for non-retrogression necessarily pursue a substantive agenda, but they do so by stealth and indirection,
without explicit statement of the value to be served. By feinting toward procedure,
non-retrogression disguises substance.”).
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irrespective of (or even despite) a particular judge’s or Justice’s substantive predispositions. And because the dynamic of non-retrogression is couched largely in non-substantive law, its triggering does not
require a cultural or legal consensus to have formed in support of a
given constitutional norm—such as heightened scrutiny for the group
at hand or a comparable regime of protection.
In mapping non-retrogression’s domain beyond the cramped
boundaries imposed by its early scholarly skeptics, this Article articulates a broader and more pliable non-retrogression principle than has
previously been contemplated. It traces non-retrogression’s ancestry
from America’s infancy all the way through modern cases in which
courts, even as they have typically not explicitly invoked non-retrogression, have nonetheless struck down acts of rights rescission by
way of a range of principles and values that form the foundation of a
broader non-retrogression framework envisioned in this Article. The
result is a set of discernable jurisprudential norms—of procedural
and jurisprudential “surrogates”15 for underlying substantive aims—
that together constitute this more dynamic strain of non-retrogression. The non-retrogression principle spans the individual reliance interests that convinced a Court unwilling to treat President Trump’s
race-laden diatribes as dispositive animus 16 to nonetheless protect
those Dreamers imperiled by the Administration’s attempt to rescind
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program as one
such “surrogate.”17 It finds expression in the broader societal and cultural reliance cited by a Court openly ambivalent about Miranda’s18

15. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1659–65
(1992) (arguing that the intersection of due process and equal protection analysis has
allowed the judicial examination of the procedures employed by political branches in
the immigration and detention contexts to operate as a “surrogate” protector of substantive individual rights).
16. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417–18 (2018) (cataloguing President Trump’s anti-Muslim public statements before holding that, notwithstanding this
record, the Trump Administration’s travel ban passed rational basis muster).
17. Compare Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891,
1913–16 (2020) (holding that President Trump’s statements “fail to raise a plausible
inference that the rescission was motivated by animus”), with id. at 1917 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]hen-candidate Trump’s declarations
that Mexican immigrants are ‘people that have lots of problems,’ ‘the bad ones,’ and
‘criminals, drug dealers, [and] rapists’ . . . ‘create the strong perception’ that the rescission decision was ‘contaminated by impermissible discriminatory animus.’” (internal
citations omitted)).
18. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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substantive validity as grounds to nonetheless uphold it.19 And it finds
further force in the civic reliance interest implicated where prior
rights-affirming interpretations of civil rights statutes are assimilated
into subsequent readings of later-enacted statutes.20
Notwithstanding this Article’s focus on the fate of equality rights
favored by progressives, non-retrogression is not a one-way ratchet:
its concepts would also complicate the rescission of rights typically
associated with conservatism (gun rights being the prime example) if
the Court’s balance of power ever shifts back to progressives’ advantage.21 These diverse settings underscore the ways in which a core
aspect of due process—the notion that the state cannot take something away from its subjects without demonstrating a good reason,22
and its embedded property23 and reliance values24—can function as
19. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (“Whether or not we
would agree with Miranda’s reasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing the
issue in the first instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now.”).
20. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576
U.S. 519, 545–46 (2015) (“The Court holds that disparate-impact claims are cognizable
under the Fair Housing Act upon considering its results-oriented language, the Court’s
interpretation of similar language in Title VII and the ADEA, Congress’ ratification of
disparate-impact claims [when enacting the FHA] against the backdrop of the unanimous view of nine Courts of Appeals, and the statutory purpose.”).
21. See infra Part IV.C.
22. See Motomura, supra note 15, at 1632; Super, supra note 13, at 1780. The socalled “due process revolution” began with Goldberg v. Kelly, in which the Court mandated trial-type procedures prior to the government’s cessation of statutory welfare
benefits. 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970). Even after the Court backtracked in subsequent
cases, it left behind mechanisms for procedural due process to continue to operate as
a tool for rights protection. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (adopting a three-part balancing test based on the individual’s interest at stake, a cost-benefit
analysis of additional procedures, and the government’s interest to determine what
process is due); Motomura, supra note 15, at 1651–53.
23. The intersection of property and rights dates back to the Vested Rights Doctrine, which achieved peak prominence in the 18th and 19th centuries, “prohibit[ing]
or otherwise limit[ing] the revocation of certain existing rights, usually in contract and
property.” Konnoth, supra note 13, at 1368; see, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,
172 (1803) (“[T]he applicant has . . . a vested legal right, of which the executive cannot
deprive him.”). The doctrine continues to do important work in areas such as land use,
where the doctrine is deployed as an end-run around environmental and safety regulations. See Steve P. Calandrillo, Chryssa Deliganis & Christina Elles, The Vested Rights
Doctrine: How a Shield Against Injustice Became a Sword for Opportunistic Developers,
78 OHIO ST. L.J. 443, 454 (2017).
24. See Edward B. Foley, Due Process, Fair Play, and Excessive Partisanship: A New
Principle for Judicial Review of Election Laws, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 655, 736 (2017) (char
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an unheralded proxy for substantive constitutional protection when
the thing that the state is attempting to take from its subjects is a right.
And the dynamic extends well beyond a judicial respect for certain reliance interests. Through an analysis of several prominent Supreme
Court and seminal lower court decisions over the past few decades,
this Article uncovers a larger story: an increasingly conservative judiciary’s willingness—despite its general resistance to equality arguments grounded in animus, privacy, disparate impact, or other substantive grounds—to occasionally freeze in place a rights-affirming
status quo when other, overriding jurisprudential issues are at stake.
That set of jurisprudential concerns can include subordinated groups’
expectations that rights protected by previous courts or the political
branches should not be revoked—as in the Court’s use of federal
preemption to strike down an Arizona statute seeking to undermine
federal discretion over how to prioritize immigration enforcement resources in pursuit of “attrition” of undocumented Arizonians.25 It includes the avoidance of arbitrary government action, as illustrated by
the federal courts’ broad rejection of Trump Administration regulations expanding the definition of foreign nationals ineligible for immigration relief based on the receipt of public assistance. 26 And it includes the invalidation of state constitutional amendments that strip

acterizing non-retrogression as vindicating individuals’ “settled expectations”); Konnoth, supra note 13, at 1405–07 (echoing the role of reliance interests in non-retrogression).
25. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012) (also noting the “expectation[]” interests among foreign nationals at stake in the case).
26. City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 981 F.3d 742,
762 (9th Cir. 2020) (deeming policy shift arbitrary and capricious under the APA); accord Cook Cnty. v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 208, 228–29, 233 (7th Cir. 2020) (affirming an injunction not under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard, but because the rule
fell outside the bounds of the INA); New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 969 F.3d
42, 74–81, 88 (2d Cir. 2020) (affirming an injunction under the arbitrary and capricious standard and as contrary to the INA, but cabining the scope of the lower court
injunction to a more limited geographical range of New York, Connecticut and Vermont). Contra CASA de Md., Inc. v. Trump, 971 F.3d 220, 245, 256 (4th Cir. 2020)
(“[T]he text and structure of the INA yield a clear answer: the term ‘public charge’ is
naturally read as meaning just that—someone who produces a money charge upon the
public for support or care. And the DHS Rule comports with this reading.”). The Fourth
Circuit granted a rehearing en banc of Casa de Maryland v. Trump, 981 F.3d 311 (4th
Cir. 2020), but the case was subsequently voluntarily dismissed by the Biden Administration. See Inst. For Constitutional Advoc. & Prot., Casa v. Trump, GEO. L.,
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/icap/our-work/defending-immigrants
-and-sanctuary-cities/casa-v-trump [https://perma.cc/RJ5E-XT53] (“In March 2021,
DHS determined that continuing to defend the [rule at issue in Casa de Maryland]
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protections against sexual orientation discrimination that citizens had
enacted through the ordinary give and take of the political process and
accordingly had come to rely upon as actual and durable.27
Non-retrogression is not merely about reliance interests; at a
deeper level, it preserves the integrity of law against arbitrary shifts
in government personnel whose unorthodox beliefs endanger settled
legal understandings developed over time.28 Non-retrogression is also
grounded in the idea that courts take seriously citizens’ evolving “understanding and expectations”29 around rights when there are good
reasons to do so. Unlike stare decisis, which ensures intra-judiciary
continuity irrespective of whether the rescission of prior rights is at
issue,30 non-retrogression is more closely tethered to foundational (if
fluctuating) due process concerns.31 Because such rule-of-law values
may at times demand the recognition of rights previously ignored (if
not denied) by the Court, non-retrogression can serve as an engine of
rights expansion where stare decisis, left to its own devices, would
counsel conservatism.32
To be sure, this Article tells a correlative, not a causal, story. Even
as it dusts for non-retrogression’s fingerprints across decades of
rights jurisprudence, it does not purport to suggest that these rulings
against litigation was neither in the public interest nor an efficient use of limited government resources, and the Department of Justice voluntarily dismissed its appeals of
judicial decisions invalidating or enjoining enforcement of the Rule.”).
27. See infra notes 147–71.
28. Non-retrogression thus recalls British theorist A. V. Dicey’s conception of law
as “utterly different from the maxims of arbitrary power.” A. V. Dicey, Droit Administratif in Modern French Law, 17 LAW Q. REV. 302, 311 (1901). For Dicey, the rule of
law “means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law
as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the government.” ALBERT V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
202 (10th ed. 1959); see also Mark D. Walters, Public Law and Ordinary Legal Method:
Revisiting Dicey’s Approach to Droit Administratif, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 53, 75 (2016)
(noting Dicey’s abhorrence for “the despotism implicit in the claims made for an extraordinary ‘law of state’ allowing the executive to set law aside whenever it wanted,
merely by invoking the salus populi”).
29. T. R. S. Allan, Dworkin and Dicey: The Rule of Law as Integrity, 8 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 266, 272 (1988) (book review).
30. The similarities and differences between non-retrogression and stare decisis
are explored at greater length infra Part II.E.3.
31. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171–72 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (describing due process as serving the tandem—if potentially incommensurate—ends of “arriving at truth” while “generating the feeling, so
important to a popular government, that justice has been done”).
32. See infra notes 260–67 and accompanying text.
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are the work of a deliberate doctrinal hand. Rather, this Article simply
observes, as others have observed before, that regressive smoke has
not always been accompanied by retrogressive fire.33 Compiling examples that span across eras, contexts, and substantive judicial ideologies, it demonstrates that Courts have routinely employed a variety
of doctrinal and procedural means in service of non-retrogression
ends.
While non-retrogression is flexible enough to extend across different rights contexts, it is less reliable than its more overt doctrinal
avatars. For example, while, as discussed in Part II.E, non-retrogression may manifest through stare decisis, it may also be negated by
similar-sounding rhetoric. In such cases, the Court uses stare decisis
as a veil to nominally uphold a right while substituting the doctrine
for a new, less protective formulation in place of the purportedly affirmed precedent. As noted in Part III, this phenomenon is of particular concern in the reproductive rights and criminal procedure contexts.
Nevertheless, this Article illustrates one sense in which judicial
underenforcement of equality norms34 can actually, under the right
circumstances, encourage progress: by delegating the doling out of
such rights to the political branches, and then erecting procedural barriers to retrogression,35 courts may effectively permit progressive regimes to make new rights more freely than their less-progressive successors can unmake them (provided, of course, that courts

33. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Foreword, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1–2, 10–11 (1972)
(commenting, in the Burger Court’s early years, that despite forebodings of a postWarren “dramatic turnabout,” the 1971 Term produced a transformation “less dramatic and more complex” than the “root-and-branch abandonment of the interventionist new equal protection” that many had anticipated: “There was no drastic rush to the
right. The changes were marginal, not cataclysmic. . . . And in a considerable number of
cases, Warren Court principles were embraced and applied”). But see supra notes 8
and 10.
34. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1227 (1978) (suggesting that if the Supreme Court is in a weak position to fully enforce certain norms of constitutional law,
the political branches have the prerogative to more fully enforce those norms, “regulat[ing] . . . behavior by standards more severe than those imposed by the federal judiciary”).
35. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976) (citing, among other
authorities, Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1281
(1975) (evaluating the extent to which procedural due process should constrain administrative actors)).
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underenforcing on the front end actually follow through with non-retrogression on the back end). 36 Fundamentally, as this Article documents, these cases illustrate that non-retrogression’s impact continues to outpace the recognition it has received among commentators
and to defy the limitations that have been placed upon it by the few
scholars who have engaged with it. At this tenuous moment in history,
it is a tradition the current Court would do well to heed, even as it has
ominously signaled its intent to do otherwise.
The balance of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a
broad scholarly account of non-retrogression, including its early articulation through the vested rights doctrine and subsequent evolution.
Part II, the heart of the Article, provides a detailed mapping across the
many legal contexts in which non-retrogression forms and gets articulated—including procedural due process, preemption, stare decisis,
discriminatory intent, arbitrary-and-capricious review under the
APA, and statutory canons such as ratification and clear statement
rules. Part III notes, however, that the non-retrogression principle has
faced limits in domains that include statutory voting rights and constitutional abortion and criminal procedure cases. Nevertheless, Part
IV details why, in the mine run of cases, non-retrogression has advanced well beyond the modest reach imagined by its early skeptics
and why its heightened impact has import in future cases of imperiled
or threatened rights. Lastly, this Article concludes as it begins, noting
how the status-quo-affirming features of non-retrogression (or its absence) may have important implications for the future of the rights
landscape as we currently know it.
I. THE SCHOLARSHIP OF NON-RETROGRESSION
The basic concept of “non-retrogression” is not new. Its application in certain statutory contexts is by now familiar—most notably in
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA),37 but also under federal environmental law’s “nondegradation” standard.38 Likewise, in narrow
36. Likewise, as noted above, the non-retrogression principle is so firmly embedded in judicial culture that a more progressive future iteration of the Court might find
it difficult to unmake rights secured under more conservative regimes. See infra Part
IV.C.
37. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (“[T]he purpose of § 5 has
always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would
lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective
exercise of the electoral franchise.”).
38. See Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 14, at 1215 n.10 (“For the past few decades,
federal regulatory regimes controlling air and water pollution have implemented a

2022]

RESCINDING RIGHTS

1693

constitutional settings, such as the Court’s Takings Clause jurisprudence, it is routine to see the status quo ante deployed as a constitutional baseline. 39 In contrast to these relatively confined uses, since
the late 1960s the Court has occasionally appeared to wield non-retrogression as a freestanding, if implicit, rule.40 Early scholarly treatments disapproved of the practice, reflecting suspicions that mere
policy preferences explained its use and skepticism of the possibility
of coherent application beyond specific substantive settings.41 While
non-retrogression has long been discussed in the statutory voting
rights context, 42 and a few commentators have occasionally (if at
times reluctantly) tracked it into other substantive arenas,43 these accounts pale in comparison to the doctrine’s broader aspirations. In
that spirit, this Article lays out a more ambitious framework for contemplating non-retrogression’s role in constitutional and quasi-constitutional rights cases.
A. THE EARLY SKEPTICAL TAKE
The literature around non-retrogression first surfaced in a string
of mid- to late-1970s articles44 discussing the Court’s opinion in Beer
nondegradation policy, freezing in place some historical baseline of air or water quality
as a floor that must at least be preserved absent some compelling social or economic
value in polluting above this level.”).
39. See id. at 1234 n.91 (“In takings cases . . . the Constitution protects the expectations of a private party in an existing (and not constitutionally compelled) state of
affairs.”); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 153 (1993) (observing
that the Takings and Contracts clauses “have defined property by reference to status
quo baselines, not to holdings under an independently defined conception of appropriate rights”).
40. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 389–91, 393 (1969) (holding unconstitutional a city charter amendment that both suspended an existing fair housing
ordinance and required referendum approval of any similar ordinance in the future,
because the latter “place[d] special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process”); see also Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 14, at 1216–17 (describing
the trigger of unconstitutionality in Hunter and similar cases as “movement from a position where some unit of state [or local] government could benefit minorities . . . to a
position where it could not”).
41. See generally Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 14. Jeffries and Levinson allow
that an “emerging national consensus” and “constitutional policy” may have justified
the use of non-retrogression to fight racial discrimination, but they insist that subsequent extensions of the principle lack an equivalent substantive basis. See id. at 1225–
26, 1231, 1233–34.
42. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
43. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Race-Conscious Reapportionment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 284, 287 (1977)
(describing the non-retrogression principle used by the Court in Beer v. United States);
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v. United States, in which the Court interpreted Section 5 of the VRA to
forbid any “retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”45 The first
abstraction of the term to a broader constitutional or quasi-constitutional protection against rights rescission appears to be Douglas Laycock’s somewhat skeptical aside in a 1981 article Taking Constitutions
Seriously, quipping that if the Framers had intended any sort of
broader non-retrogression to guide constitutional interpretation,
surely they could have found a way to say so in the document itself.46
The first prominent expression of non-retrogression as an overarching constitutional obstacle to rights rescission is a 1998 article by
John Jeffries and Daryl Levinson entitled, appropriately enough, The
Non-Retrogression Principle in Constitutional Law. 47 There, the authors look—again, unsympathetically—upon what they call a “peculiar” trend among courts to base the constitutionality of a given government action upon “the state of affairs that existed before the
change.”48 From there, the authors provide an extensive critique of a
perceived growing non-retrogressive judicial tendency. For them, this
tells the story of a federal judiciary that has lost its way.
Notwithstanding their overall critique of non-retrogression, Jeffries and Levinson acknowledge its legitimacy in the singular context
of race.49 Although they worry about the doctrinal incoherence caused
Note, United Jewish Organizations v. Carey and the Need to Recognize Aggregate Voting
Rights, 87 YALE L.J. 571, 578 (1978) (describing the United Jewish Organizations plurality opinion’s application of Beer’s non-retrogression principle); Note, Group Representation and Race-Conscious Apportionment: The Roles of States and the Federal Courts,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1847, 1850 (1978) (detailing non-retrogression as the “separate
standard for Voting Rights Act cases”). The term is also used in the context of international human rights treaties. See, e.g., Rebecca J. Cook, U.S. Population Policy, Sex Discrimination, and Principles of Equality Under International Law, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 93, 133 (1987) (applying concept of non-retrogression to “human rights treaties[,
which] are perceived to require progressive advancement towards human rights goals
and assurance that human rights not be reduced”).
45. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (emphasis added).
46. Douglas Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of Judicial Review,
59 TEX. L. REV. 343, 350 (1981) (book review) (suggesting that references to “preexisting rights” or “rights heretofore enjoyed” in the language of the Ninth Amendment
“would have been the obvious way to express a nonretrogression principle if that had
been intended” (emphasis added)).
47. Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 14; see also Stephen F. Smith, Activism as Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1057, 1078 n.100 (2002) (characterizing Jeffries and Levinson as having borrowed their principle from voting rights
terminology).
48. Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 14, at 1211–12.
49. Id. at 1215–23.
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by a substantively untethered jurisprudence, they see the race context
as offering a recognized “constitutional policy” 50 with a substantive
grounding that makes judicial non-retrogression legitimate. Given the
present-day doctrinal limitations in advancing the fight against private racial discrimination, they conclude that non-retrogression in the
race context makes “practical sense.”51 Because the same overarching
constitutional norms are not present in contexts in which non-retrogression is used, especially Romer v. Evans52—a case involving sexual
orientation discrimination—they find the broader use of non-retrogression, and Romer in particular, “adrift in judicial activism, habituated to movement but with no idea where to go.”53 In short, Jeffries
and Levinson take a dim view of a broader non-retrogression norm in
constitutional law.
B. LATER, MORE FAVORABLE APPROACHES: NON-RETROGRESSION IN THE
VESTED RIGHTS DOCTRINE
More recent approaches to non-retrogression have expanded it
beyond the narrow boundaries imposed by its early skeptics. While
the bulk of the literature drawing on Jeffries and Levinson spends less
time engaging in what exactly non-retrogression analysis is, instead
simply acknowledging that it exists, 54 a few scholars have delved
50. Id. at 1231.
51. Id. at 1215, 1223.
52. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
53. Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 14, at 1234. For a discussion of how Romer
illustrates a critical dividing line between stare decisis and non-retrogression, see infra
Part II.E.3.
54. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Let’s Call the Whole Thing Off: Can States Abolish the
Institution of Marriage?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 697, 702 (2010) (citing Jeffries and Levinson’s
article for the proposition that “[t]he Supreme Court has interpreted the antidiscrimination principle to prohibit this sort of retrogression in various areas of constitutional
law”); Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Symposium on International Women’s Rights: Promoting Global Equality for Women Through the Law, 34 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 106, 160
(2013) (citing Jeffries and Levinson for the simple proposition that “[n]on-retrogression means you cannot go back”); Jocelyn Benson, Turning Lemons into Lemonade:
Making Georgia v. Ashcroft the Mobile v. Bolden of 2007, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 485,
486 n.7 (2004) (“[Jeffries and Levinson] define[] retrogression as allowing a jurisdiction to ‘extend protection beyond what the Constitution requires’ but forbidding it to
‘retreat from that extension once made.’”); Conor O’Mahony, If a Constitution Is Easy to
Amend, Can Judges Be Less Restrained? Rights, Social Change, and Proposition 8, 27
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 191, 214 (2014) (finding “Proposition 8 effectively violated the principle of non-retrogression” as defined by Jeffries and Levinson); Donald P. Harris, An
Unconventional Approach to Reviewing the Judicially Unreviewable: Applying the
Dormant Commerce Clause to Copyright, 104 KY. L.J. 47, 70 n.175 (2016) (“Jeffries and
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deeper. Craig Konnoth provides a comprehensive and detailed inquiry
into the vested rights doctrine that picks up right where Jeffries and
Levinson’s story left off. While recognizing Jeffries and Levinson’s dismissal of the non-retrogression principle as representing “no more
than judicial policymaking,”55 Konnoth brings a far different outlook,
enthusiastically tracing the deep historical antecedents to modernday non-retrogression all the way through several prominent cases
decided after publication of Jeffries and Levinson’s article.
1. The Vested Rights Doctrine and Its Limits
The doctrine of vested rights, which “prohibits or otherwise limits the revocation of certain existing rights, usually in contract and
property,” 56 dates back to the Nation’s infancy and was one of the
“leading doctrines of American Constitutional Law before the Civil
War.” 57 Cited “repeatedly on the floor of the Convention of 1787” 58
and in foundational case law from the late 1700s and early 1800s,59
some have argued that the doctrine was elemental in elaborating upon
Levinson argue that defining judicial activism is more nuanced and depends upon,
among other things, whether the legislation takes away rights rather than extends
rights.”); Ruby J. Garrett, A Call for Prophylactic Measures to Save “Souls to the Polls”:
Importing a Retrogression Analysis in § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
633, 665 n.209 (2015) (citing Jeffries and Levinson in support of the notion that
“[r]etrogression has been successful in other areas of the law” beyond voting rights).
55. Konnoth, supra note 13, at 1371.
56. Id. at 1368.
57. Edward S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH.
L. REV. 247, 247 (1914).
58. Id. at 255.
59. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 172 (1803) (“[T]he applicant has . . .
a vested legal right, of which the executive cannot deprive him.”); Ogden v. Saunders,
25 U.S. 213, 238 (1827) (“[T]he legislature of the State cannot interfere, by law, in the
particular case of A. or B., to injure or impair rights which have become vested under
contracts.”); Bowman v. Middleton, 1 S.C.L. 252, 252 (1792) (“[I]t was against common
right, as well as against Magna Charta, [for a South Carolina legislative body] to take
away the freehold of one man, and vest it in another; and that too, to the prejudice of
third persons, without any compensation, or even a trial by a jury of the country, to
determine the right in question.”). In a 1914 piece discussing the origins of constitutional law, Professor Corwin argued that vested rights’ role in American jurisprudence
dates back even further, citing case law from the 1780s either “simply assum[ing]” the
doctrine’s existence or “invok[ing] similar principles.” Corwin, supra note 57, at 255–
56 (citing Symbury Case, Kirby 444 (1785); Ham v. McClaws, 1 S.C.L. 93 (1789));
Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall) 304, 310 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (“The preservation of property then is a primary object of the social compact, and, by the late Constitution of Pennsylvania, was made a fundamental law. . . . The legislature, therefore,
had no authority to make an act devesting one citizen of his freehold, and vesting it in
another, without a just compensation.”).
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the divisions and limitations of state power envisioned in the Constitution.60 Essentially, through the vested rights doctrine, the judiciary
empowered itself to nullify executive and legislative intrusions onto
the property or contractual rights of their constituents.61 Under this
doctrine, such intrusions would be void, not under any specific constitutional provision, but rather “under the general principles of Constitutional Law held to underlie all constitutions.”62
Whether an intrusion had occurred depended upon the extent to
which the right had “vested” in its owner. Under the common law,
vesting could occur by “right, title, or time.”63 Correspondingly, under
the post-U.S. Constitution vested rights doctrine, the traditional avenue to a vested right was through so-called “formalities” that closely
tracked core property and contractual principles: outward expressions of inner possessory or transactional states of mind such as consideration, consent, and so on.64
Beyond (1) formalities, courts developed two additional factors
held to be probative of whether vesting had occurred: (2) time—the
notion that the longer a person possesses a thing, the more that thing
assimilates into the person’s sense of self and becomes dearer to part
with, and (3) reliance—the notion that, where possession of something has influenced subsequent behavior, the person’s claim to that
thing is worthy of heightened protection.65 Each of these three factors
related to the fundamental connection between the person and the
thing, and helped evaluate whether that bond was sufficient to constitute a vested right.66 Crucially, under the vested rights doctrine, once
that threshold was crossed, the right would become “part of the individual, no matter the legal regime”67 and would “no longer [be] dependent . . . upon the common law or statute under which it may have
been acquired.”68

60. Corwin, supra note 57, at 255–57.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 258.
63. Konnoth, supra note 13, at 1388 (quoting 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS
AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 122 (Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1998) (1235–1240)).
64. Id. at 1388–89. Formalities contribute to vesting through (1) encouraging reliance, (2) instilling a “sense of legitimate entitlement” in the putative rights holder,
and (3) “recognizing the mutual dignity of both promises.” Id. at 1413.
65. Id. at 1406–07.
66. Id. at 1406.
67. Id. at 1405.
68. Golden v. Parker, 138 P.3d 285, 290 (Colo. 2006) (quoting Ficarra v. Dep’t of
Regul. Agencies, Div. of Ins., 849 P.2d 6, 15 (Colo. 1993)).
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While early invocations of vested rights tended to cling tightly to
traditional property and contractual contexts, over time, the doctrine
has been explored and considered more broadly, particularly as the
legal definition of property has expanded to “include all legally defined interests.”69 To some, the idea of vested rights stands as forebearer to 20th-century expansions of substantive due process.70 Others dispute this lineage, noting that, unlike the vested rights doctrine,
substantive due process is expressly constitutionally grounded, thus
questioning whether vested rights ever truly presented an operative
mechanism for courts to check the political branches.71 Craig Konnoth
has identified traces of it in 21st-century same-sex marriage claims
brought by plaintiffs retroactively stripped of their right to marry72
and in mid-century successful challenges to the revocation of “vested”
(as characterized in scholarly literature, but not by the Court) welfare
benefits.73 He even takes on the fascinating exercise of reframing the
Court’s 2012 invalidation of the Affordable Care Act’s state-funding
Medicaid provision. For Konnoth, the Court’s undue coercion analysis
is clearer and more robust, though not ultimately persuasive, when
viewed through the lens of vested rights—the states’ vested rights in
established Medicaid funding (albeit something the federal government had never been obligated to offer in the first place).74
For one scholar at least, the link between vested rights and nonretrogression is clear. 75 Edward Foley establishes this link narrowly—in the context of voting rights.76 For Foley, the Due Process

69. See James L. Kainen, The Historical Framework for Reviving Constitutional Protection for Property and Contract Rights, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 114 (1993).
70. See Laura Inglis, Substantive Due Process: Continuation of Vested Rights?, 52
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 459, 460 (2012) (“Corwin portrays vested rights as the immediate
forerunner to substantive due process.”).
71. See id. at 461. Konnoth’s strongest argument against grounding vested rights
in substantive due process is that substantive due process creates non-existing rights,
while vested rights is about preserving the existing. If no right existed, then vested
rights can offer no protection—and that is not the case with substantive due process.
Konnoth, supra note 13, at 1374.
72. Konnoth, supra note 13, at 1416; Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1209 (D.
Utah 2014) (“[T]he State must demonstrate some state interest in divesting Plaintiffs
of their already vested marriage rights.”).
73. Konnoth, supra note 13, at 1418 (emphasizing that “the Court did not invoke
the time, reliance, or formality factors of typical vested rights analysis”).
74. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577 (2012).
75. See Foley, supra note 24, at 731–38 (arguing that vested rights, a due process
outgrowth, prevents the roll-back of voting rights).
76. See id.
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Clause’s inherent “fair play” paradigm encapsulates vested rights. 77
Because procedural due process has been judicially expanded to apply
to more and more areas,78 Foley has no qualms using it in the voting
context, where vested rights prevent, in his eyes, the retrogression of
pre-existing voting rights.79
2. Probing (and Expanding) Non-Retrogression’s Frontiers
The differences between these two non-retrogression strains—
one tethered to vested rights, the other connected to broader and
more flexible procedural and jurisprudential protections against
rights revocation—are numerous. First, the vested rights doctrine’s
utility is handcuffed80 by its allegiance to principles of ownership: in
the vested rights context, “owning a right connects the right to, and
embeds the right in, the individual,” and this ownership “represents a
philosophical and psychological connection between an individual
and the right.”81 In practice, this construct has proved limiting.82 So,
by contrast, this Article champions an approach that focuses less on
whether the claimant to a rescinded right can be said to have a property-like or ownership interest in the putative right, and more on
whether the rescinding of that right implicates the same jurisprudential values that courts typically seek to animate or protect within the
antecedent doctrine of vested rights. To be sure, a property or contractual interest could be among these values, but the set need not be
limited to those contemplated under vested rights. Instead, it may include procedural safeguards or deficiencies, reliance interests, stability, institutionalism, and other “small-c” conservative values that animate the vested rights doctrine.83
Relatedly, while the vested rights doctrine does take stock of reliance interests, it can do so only as far as those reliance interests help
77. Id.
78. Id. at 692.
79. Id. at 731–38.
80. Indeed, the doctrine’s limited ability to protect rights holders, and the resulting need for more robust protections, is perhaps best evidenced by the rise of substantive due process to fill that void.
81. Konnoth, supra note 13, at 1375 (emphasis added).
82. See Super, supra note 13, at 1868–69 (“To obtain protection under the Takings Clause, the Court still required that rights be ‘vested,’ defining that term so formalistically as to exclude most of what came to be known as the New Property.”); see
also Kainen, supra note 69, at 105 (“The notion of vested rights acquired under existing
law was narrower than the universe of all legal interests defined by the law existing at
the time of past transactions or considerations.”).
83. See infra Part II.
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create a bona fide vested interest in the right—a three-pronged calculus in which the requisite formality and time inquiries dilute the reliance prong’s impact.84 By contrast, in this Article’s approach, reliance
interests (and related jurisprudential concerns) alone can trigger a judicial voiding of putative political branch rights retrogression.85 Thus,
for example, where an unformalized right may only have existed for a
short time span, and therefore may not plausibly have “vested,” it
might nonetheless trigger the protections envisioned in this Article’s
approach, provided it induces sufficient reliance.
Finally, the vested rights doctrine differs from this Article’s proposed approach in one simple, but crucial way: courts don’t generally
use it.86 The limited modern examples cited above87 illustrate both the
exceptions that prove the rule and, in fact, the rule itself. Not only are
vested rights examples rare, but many of those would-be rare examples do not actually invoke the doctrine at all. Thus, even if vested
rights principles may occasionally inform decisionmakers’ thought
processes, they do not end up supporting the actual decisions themselves.88 There may be any number of reasons (some of which are discussed in this Article) why courts are loath to rely upon vested rights,
and hesitant to advertise the rare occasions on which they do so. But,
regardless of the why, the what and the how matter. It matters that
vested rights is a dormant doctrine.89 Accordingly, in contrast to the
vested rights doctrine, this Article seeks to meet courts where they already are: articulating the procedural, reliance, and other jurisprudential values that courts are actually, expressly, sensitive to, and illuminating how those values prevent courts from rescinding rights they
might not otherwise deem worthy of protection in the first place.90
II. MAPPING NON-RETROGRESSION
Even as the vested rights analysis has diminished, other doctrines
have emerged to carry the non-retrogression baton. In recent cases
84. See supra Part I.B.
85. See infra Part II.
86. See Konnoth, supra note 13, at 1368 (“A mainstay of constitutional litigation
in the nineteenth century, the doctrine was rarely invoked after the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments except in specialized areas of litigation involving, for example, zoning and pensions.”). Indeed, as Konnoth notes, “courts do not necessarily rely
on formal constitutional doctrines when they resist rights revocation.” Id. at 1369.
87. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 70.
89. See supra Part I.B; Konnoth, supra note 13, at 1368.
90. See infra Part II.
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spanning an array of substantive settings—immigration, reproductive
rights, LGBTQ rights, criminal procedure, employment, housing, and
more—the Court has repeatedly intervened, largely on non-substantive grounds, to restore a preexisting baseline of substantive protection. Most of the cases share a telltale procedural whipsaw: the grant
of an entitlement to some marginalized group, a subsequent attempt
to rescind the grant, and judicial rejection of the attempted rescission.91 Crucially, this pattern is not confined to settings where a cultural or legal consensus has already crystalized in support of a substantive goal—such as suspect-class status for the group at hand or
some comparable protection regime.92 The underlying reasons vary—
from procedural due process 93 to federal preemption rules, 94 from
stare decisis95 to animus doctrine,96 and from the arbitrary-and-capricious standard under the APA97 to interpretative canons of construction such as clear statement rules to congressional ratification 98 —
with corresponding effects on the baseline restoration’s permanence.
Through these cases, a unifying non-retrogression theme has become
sufficiently discernible to preserve constitutional and quasi-constitutional baselines even before a substantively unsympathetic Court.
A. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The doctrine of procedural due process has often functioned as a
“surrogate” for substantive protections that courts have invoked to

91. Notably, a successful Section 5 claim need not fit this pattern, except in the
theoretical sense that one’s current ability to exercise the electoral franchise necessarily reflects a prior grant of rights, no matter how stingy. Cf. Beer v. United States,
425 U.S. 130, 138 (1976) (holding that certain components of New Orleans’s governance structure predating Section 5’s enactment lay beyond Section 5’s reach). The
cases identified in this Article therefore embody principles—particularly, that the government should not arbitrarily or unpredictably go back on its word—that the generally unilinear nature of Section 5 non-retrogression cannot fully capture.
92. On the other hand, non-retrogression is not irrelevant in contexts where the
substantive foundation is relatively solid, as the Court’s stare decisis holdings demonstrate. See infra text accompanying notes 235–57.
93. See infra Part II.A.
94. See infra Part II.B.
95. See infra Part II.E.
96. See infra Part II.C.
97. See infra Part II.D.
98. See infra Part II.F.
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prevent the rescission or taking of individual rights.99 Indeed, in certain contexts, courts have invoked procedural due process in ways
that have clouded—perhaps unintentionally—the line between procedure and substance.100 This has significant implications for non-retrogression. For one, while the vested rights doctrine, even when active, typically applied to economic rights only, 101 early nonretrogression procedural due process cases established footholds in
both the economic 102 and non-economic rights contexts. 103 Second,
procedural due process has built upon vested rights’ ability to safeguard rights that otherwise enjoyed no underlying standalone constitutional protection.
This latter dynamic was accelerated by the Court’s 1970 Goldberg
v. Kelly decision,104 which kicked off what would become known as the
“due process revolution.” 105 In Goldberg, the Court concluded that
99. Motomura, supra note 15, at 1628 (discussing the immigration context specifically); see also Foley, supra note 24, at 731–38 (arguing that due process prevents
the retrogression of voting rights).
100. See generally Motomura, supra note 15; see also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S.
21, 33 (1982) (noting, in the context of procedural due process decisions concerning
the rights of foreign nationals, that the Court in fact was issuing rulings of substantive
constitutional law).
101. See supra Part I.B.1; Kainen, supra note 69, at 105.
102. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 362 (1886) (holding that to functionally compel operational laundromats run by Chinese nationals to shutter would be
to “depriv[e] such parties of their property without due process of law”); see also Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 483 (1931) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins and Wong Wing v. United States in support of the Court’s holding that a non-enemy
foreign national was “entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment” and therefore
due “just compensation” for the U.S. government’s wartime requisitioning of two preexisting shipbuilding contracts); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407 (1930) (holding that a Texas statute could not invalidate pre-existing contractual rights for out-ofstate parties without violating the Due Process Clause); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y.
378, 398 (1856) (“When a law annihilates the value of property, and strips it of its
attributes, by which alone it is distinguished as property, the owner is deprived of it
according to the plainest interpretation, and certainly within the spirit of a constitutional provision [the Due Process Clause] expressly to shield private rights from the
exercise of arbitrary power.”).
103. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (holding that the
political branches may not punish non-citizens with hard labor without due process);
Kwock v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 457 (1920) (holding that procedural due process requires judicial intervention in cases where U.S. citizens have been deprived of their
right to re-enter the country by way of “manifestly unfair” administrative proceedings,
while finding that this threshold had not been met in this case’s factual circumstances).
104. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
105. Motomura, supra note 15, at 1632; see also Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of
Hearing”, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1300 (1975) (noting the trend, after Goldberg v. Kelly,
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even as New York City residents held no underlying substantive
“right” to certain welfare benefits, the government could not rescind
those benefits without affording the beneficiaries trial-type procedures.106 In doing so, it “rejected wooden reliance on the right-privilege distinction in the context of a procedural due process claim,”107
opening the door for new classes of “rights” with no standalone constitutional protection to nonetheless be constitutionally shielded from
retrogression—again, much like the vested economic rights of yore,108
and yet now unencumbered by vested rights’ economic-only purview.109
Even as the Burger Court moved quickly to “sap[] Goldberg of
much of its vitality,” 110 procedural due process has managed to remain, at times, an operative and versatile constraint on rights retrogression.111 The question, of course, is when and how can this happen?
Clues may be found in perhaps the most prominent case limiting the
reach of Goldberg. Under Mathews v. Eldridge, procedural due process
concerns arise where the government’s attempts to deprive constituents of an interest or benefit raise certain procedural red flags.112 Nevertheless, the definition of what counts as “procedural” under
to transplant protections to “one area after another” by asking, “‘If there, why not
here?’”); Joseph Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A Revolution Reconsidered,
47 CONN. L. REV. 879, 888 (2015) (noting expansion of due process protections after
Goldberg to the contexts of government employment, public schools, prisons, utilities,
and alcohol consumption). See generally id. (noting transplantation of procedural due
process protections to immigration and national security cases involving the rights of
non-citizens).
106. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264.
107. Motomura, supra note 15, at 1651.
108. See Konnoth, supra note 13, at 1386 (“Under the [Vested Rights] doctrine, a
failure to provide the right in the first place merits no constitutional scrutiny. However,
revocation of the right once vested (if even possible) demands the accouterments of
due process.”). In this sense, the vested rights doctrine is perhaps as much a philosophical forebearer to modern procedural due process as it is more commonly recognized
to have been for modern substantive due process. See, e.g., Kainen, supra note 69, at
111–12; Inglis, supra note 70, at 460.
109. Kainen, supra note 69, at 105.
110. Super, supra note 13, at 1780 (citing Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128–29
(1985) and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976)). The Rehnquist court would
further limit Goldberg. See, e.g., Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 60–61
(1999).
111. See also Super, supra note 13, at 1875–77 (mining traces of unspoken procedural due process and Takings Clause analysis, by way of reliance, in the Court’s 2012
Affordable Care Act decision striking down the federal government’s threat to withdraw Medicaid benefits, and in the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of Proposition 8’s attempt
to deprive California same-sex couples of their previously intact right to marry).
112. Eldridge, 424 U.S at 335.
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Mathews’s three-part test can easily overlap into the domain of substantive rights protections.113
Indeed, the Mathews test has proven vital to preserving constitutional rights in a range of cases and contexts. For example, in Landon
v. Plasencia, the Court, applying Mathews, mandated a hearing before
permitting the government to exclude a lawful permanent resident returning to the United States from a brief sojourn abroad.114 Engaging
an interpretation of the applicable immigration regulations, the Court
admitted that its decision, however “procedural,” was actually one of
substantive “constitutional law” 115 —namely, “the right ‘to stay and
live and work in this land of freedom’” 116 and “the right to rejoin
[one’s] immediate family”—both of which were protected through
due process balancing.117
After 9/11, the Court again made due process a non-retrogressive
vehicle when it applied Mathews to protect a U.S. citizen detainee in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.118 The Court recognized that, even when it came to
suspected enemy combatants, procedural due process remained a vehicle for safeguarding “the most elemental of liberty interests—the interest in being free from physical detention by one’s own government.”119 When the Supreme Court revisited the question of habeas
protections for non-citizen detainees at Guantanamo Bay in
Boumediene v. Bush, it again looked to Mathews for inspiration, noting
“that the necessary scope of habeas review in part depends upon the
rigor of any earlier proceedings,” a concept that “accords with our test
for procedural adequacy in the due process context” under
Mathews.120
What does this mean for non-retrogression specifically? Importantly, it suggests that courts may be most inclined to push back
against rights retrogression when the putative rescinder has encroached upon judicially valued concerns that extend beyond (but potentially overlap with) the substantive benefit or right itself. With the
113. See generally Landau, supra note 105 (discussing how Mathews’s consideration of harm to the individual and related interests under its procedural due process
balancing test practically requires substantive analysis of the rights of foreign nationals where their rights are raised).
114. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 37 (1982).
115. Id. at 33.
116. Id. at 34.
117. Id.
118. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529–35 (2004).
119. Id. at 529.
120. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 781 (2008).
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passage of time, and increasingly within recent constitutional and
statutory cases, such a picture of non-retrogression has come further
into view, across a range of doctrinal arenas, as courts have implicitly
if not explicitly resisted rights retrogression through non-substantive
jurisprudential principles.
B. PREEMPTION
Outside of procedural due process, preemption doctrine in immigration law—and in particular the invalidation of state efforts to enforce federal immigration policy—has become another important locus of non-retrogression. Despite undocumented immigrants’ lack of
suspect-class protection and the often prohibitively heavy burden of
proving discriminatory purpose in immigration cases, courts have
treated the federal government’s underenforcement of its own laws
as engendering cognizable reliance interests among individuals
spared from removal.121 An “institutional competence” concern—specifically, that states will be unable or unwilling to avoid arbitrary or
invidious enforcement decisions—reinforces these otherwise removable individuals’ “right to be left alone” for as long as the federal government sees fit to leave them alone.122
This idea has important application in a group of recent cases
challenging state immigration restrictions. Although these laws affect
Latinx communities almost exclusively, the Supreme Court’s discriminatory intent standard proves too high a bar for a successful equal
protection challenge,123 and courts have refused to recognize undocumented immigrants as a “suspect class” deserving strict scrutiny.124
Yet, where states seek to enforce immigration laws against undocumented immigrants whom the federal government has chosen to
leave alone, effectively expanding enforcement to a broader group of
people than the federal policy, courts have preserved the preexisting
state of affairs—often referencing certain “rights” threatened under
121. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395–97 (2012).
122. See Motomura, supra note 15, at 1646.
123. See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 538–42 (M.D. Pa.
2007) (finding no equal protection violation because plaintiffs failed to prove any discriminatory purpose).
124. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976) (holding that undocumented foreign nationals lack the same “colorable constitutional claim to a share in the bounty
that a conscientious sovereign makes available to its own citizens”); Reginald Oh, Dehumanization, Immigrants, and Equal Protection, 56 CAL. W. L. REV. 103, 130 (2019)
(criticizing the Court’s “dehumaniz[ing]” rationale for declining to consider undocumented adults to be a suspect class).
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state legislation—through the doctrine of preemption. Arizona v.
United States well illustrates this idea,125 as do a host of lower-court
rulings decided around the same time as Arizona.126
In Arizona, the Supreme Court invalidated three provisions of an
Arizona statute known as S.B. 1070,127 by which the state sought “attrition” of the state’s undocumented immigrant population through
unilateral enforcement of federal immigration law. 128 Given S.B.
1070’s apparent targeting of Arizona’s Latinx community,129 the case
might plausibly have turned on animus doctrine or related equal protection principles. 130 Instead, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the
Court looked mainly to the federal government’s “broad, undoubted
125. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
126. See, e.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d
757, 764–72 (N.D. Tex. 2007); Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1054–
57 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
127. The statute’s nickname refers to the version introduced in the Arizona Senate.
S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). The Arizona Court invalidated Section
3 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13–1509(A)), which created a state misdemeanor
for non-compliance with federal immigrant-registration requirements, 567 U.S. at 403;
Section 5(C) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(C)), which went beyond federal law by making it a misdemeanor for an undocumented immigrant to seek or engage in work in Arizona, id. at 407; and Section 6 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133883(A)(5)), which guaranteed warrantless arrest where an officer has probable
cause to believe that an individual is removable under U.S. law, id. at 410. The Court
upheld Section 2(B) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11–1051(B) (West 2012)),
which required officers, in some circumstances, to verify detainees’ immigration status
with the federal government, id. at 415.
128. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 393 (quoting S.B. 1070’s uncodified Section 1, which specified that the bill’s purpose was to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of [undocumented foreign nationals] and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States”).
129. See Frequently Asked Questions About the Arizona Racial Profiling Law, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/other/frequently-asked-questions-about-arizona-racial
-profiling-law [https://perma.cc/HXJ9-YDUE] (“In the early studies we’ve seen on the
impact of local police engaging in enforcement of immigration laws, there have been
clear spikes in the targeting of Latinos for minor, misdemeanor offenses . . . .”).
130. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (invalidating Colorado ballot initiative removing non-discrimination protections from gay, lesbian, and bisexual
persons as “inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects”); Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (invalidating a Texas anti-sodomy law on animus
grounds); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (invalidating the Defense
of Marriage Act’s refusal to recognize valid same-sex marriages as predicated upon animus); Chapter Four: Animus and Sexual Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1767, 1767
(2014) (noting that the Court has recently shown “awareness of—and antagonism toward—government actions fueled by animus toward sexual minorities” and that “antigay animus has played a recurring and pivotal role in the landmark trio of Romer v.
Evans, Lawrence v. Texas, and, most recently, United States v. Windsor” (footnotes omitted)).
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power over the subject of immigration” and to Congress’s authorization of a removal system in which “broad [Executive Branch] discretion” is a “principal feature.”131 Because three of S.B. 1070’s provisions
either conflicted with existing federal law or trespassed on a vacant
field that only Congress could occupy,132 federal preemption principles required their invalidation.133
Within its seemingly dry preemption analysis, the Court noted
how immigration policy affects “the perceptions and expectations of
[foreign nationals] in this country who seek the full protection of its
laws.”134 From there, the Court noted how prosecutorial discretion—
namely, the decision not to exercise the government’s full enforcement authority against deportable foreign nationals—“embraces immediate human concerns.”135 Specifically:
Unauthorized workers trying to support their families, for example, likely
pose less danger than [those] . . . who commit a serious crime. The equities of
an individual case may turn on many factors, including whether the [foreign
national] has children born in the United States, long ties to the community,
or a record of distinguished military service.136

In this sense, Arizona is as much about attending to certain immigrants’ vested interest in continuing to participate in American community life as it is about federal preemption doctrine.137 While in the
Court’s own telling, Arizona concerned those “who do not have a lawful right to be in this country,”138 the practical impact of the decision
was to restore an effective “right” created or strengthened by the federal government’s discretionary reallocation of enforcement resources, which were likely influenced by the increasingly common use
of prosecutorial discretion 139 and the then-newly announced DACA
131. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 394, 396.
132. See id. at 399.
133. Id. at 403, 407, 410.
134. Id. at 395 (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 396.
136. Id.
137. Kennedy suggests that the benefits of honoring this reliance interest are mutually felt: “The history of the United States is in part made of the stories, talents, and
lasting contributions of those who crossed oceans and deserts to come here.” Id. at 416.
138. Id. at 392–93.
139. The U.S. government has repeatedly noted that resource constraints require
the prioritization of enforcement resources for “promotion of national security, border
security, public safety, and the integrity of the immigration system.” See Memorandum
from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens 2 (June 17, 2011)
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policy.140 The case therefore stands as a core example of the Court’s
application of non-retrogression principles, preserving the status quo
to safeguard a de facto “right to be left alone” under federal policy for
undocumented foreign nationals that states cannot so easily rescind
through their legislative processes.141
C. ANIMUS
In a series of decisions typically classified under the animus heading, courts have offset their hesitance to make clear pronouncements
on the content of LGBTQ rights by articulating an unusually expansive

https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial
-discretion-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ERF-V2W4]; see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Immigration and Naturalization Service Fact Sheet on Prosecutorial Discretion Guidelines (Nov. 17, 2000) available at https://www.aila.org/infonet/ins-memo-on
-prosecutorial-discretion [https://perma.cc/GW8X-XFPM] (“Prosecutorial discretion
is the authority that every law enforcement agency has to decide whether to exercise
its enforcement powers against someone.”); Memorandum from Doris Meissner,
Comm’r of Immigr. and Naturalization Serv., on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion
(Nov. 17, 2000) https://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/
IMM-Memo-ProsDiscretion.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2FW-KVH2].
140. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas,
Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs
Enf’t
(June
15,
2012),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising
-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/XVL8-RS6B].
141. An earlier example of this line of reasoning appeared in Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 724 F.3d 297
(3d Cir. 2013), a U.S. district court decision on a challenge to local ordinances enacted
by the city of Hazleton, Pennsylvania. Among other provisions, the ordinances banned
employment and harboring of undocumented immigrants and required tenants to obtain occupancy permits, which would issue only upon proof of lawful residence. Id. at
484–85. The Hazleton plaintiffs argued both that the law violated equal protection and
that it was preempted by federal law. Id. The court rejected the equal protection challenge because the ordinances were facially neutral and it found insufficient evidence
of discriminatory intent. Id. at 539–40. It sustained the preemption challenge, however, noting that the federal law balanced the goal of finding and removing undocumented immigrants against the burden on employers and workers and the possibility
of accidentally removing authorized immigrants or citizens. Id. at 531. The ordinances
conflicted with federal law, according to this reasoning, because they “assume[d] that
the federal government seeks the removal of all undocumented [foreign nationals]”
and thereby put too much weight on the “find and remove” side of the equation. Id.
Hazleton, like Arizona, invoked preemption to provide certain de facto rights to undocumented foreign nationals who would otherwise be devoid of constitutional protection—a recurring theme in other lower-court opinions as well. See, e.g., Villas at
Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 764–72 (N.D. Tex.
2007); Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1054–57 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
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understanding of reliance: in recently granted rights,142 in the traditional federal-state division of power,143 in an uninterrupted proliferation of statutory antidiscrimination protections,144 and so on. Beginning with Romer v. Evans145 and culminating in Obergefell v. Hodges,146
the Supreme Court has vindicated a host of rights for LGBTQ individuals and couples through a string of oblique doctrinal protections that
travel under the non-retrogression banner.
1. Romer v. Evans
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Romer found unconstitutional animus behind an amendment to the Colorado Constitution147
nullifying existing antidiscrimination protections for gays, lesbians,
and bisexuals and prohibiting any state or local government institution from protecting Coloradans from sexual orientation discrimination.148 Because Amendment 2 was “inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affect[ed],”149 it failed what the Court implied
was rational basis scrutiny, for “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” 150 Animus was therefore a crucial consideration in Romer, but
not to the exclusion of non-retrogression themes. Rather, the Court’s
formulation of animus doctrine is informed and supplemented by at
least two non-retrogression principles—one narrow, one far more expansive.
First, the Court faulted Colorado for constitutionalizing the question of what protections gays, lesbians, and bisexuals could demand
from all levels of government, removing it from the ordinary give and
take of democratic politics and thereby “impos[ing] a special disability
upon those persons alone.” 151 It was Amendment 2’s “general an-

142. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 629 (1996).
143. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013).
144. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 628.
145. Id.
146. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
147. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b, invalidated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
148. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623–24, 634–36.
149. Id. at 632.
150. Id. at 634 (alteration in original) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973)).
151. Id. at 631. “Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or
may seek without constraint. They can obtain specific protection against discrimina-
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nouncement” stripping gays, lesbians, and bisexuals from legal protections at all levels of government152 that sealed the Court’s inference
of unconstitutional animus.153 Such reasoning is consistent with a line
of precedent154 distinguishing “mere repeal”155 of antidiscrimination
protections from a “retreat to a higher and presumably less favorable
level of political decision,”156 with the latter raising special constitutional concerns. 157 The Court did not explicitly espouse this higherlevel-repeal theory of equal protection—unlike the Colorado Supreme
Court, 158 whose judgment Romer affirmed on different grounds. 159
But it is implicit in the Court’s holding that “[a] law declaring that in
general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all
others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.”160
This higher-level repeal theory of Romer is admittedly narrow; it
might be read to create a safe harbor for a revocation of rights that

tion only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the State Constitution or perhaps, on the State’s view, by trying to pass helpful laws of general applicability.” Id.; see
also id. at 633 (noting that Amendment 2 violated “the principle that government and
each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance”).
152. Id. at 635.
153. Id. at 634–35 (noting that the Amendment produced “immediate, continuing,
and real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate justifications that may be claimed
for it”).
154. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
155. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 390 n.5.
156. Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 14, at 1217.
157. Id. at 1217–18.
158. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993), aff’d, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Reitman, Hunter, and Seattle each concerned racial discrimination. See, e.g., Hunter, 393
U.S. at 391 (objecting to the placement of “special burdens on racial minorities within
the governmental process”). But in Evans the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted the
higher-level-repeal standard to be trans-substantive, 854 P.2d 1270 at 1279–80, relying on Justice White’s contention in Hunter that “the State may [not] disadvantage any
particular group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf,” 393 U.S.
at 393 (emphasis added).
159. Romer, 517 U.S. at 626 (“We . . . now affirm the judgment, but on a rationale
different from that adopted by the State Supreme Court.”). But see id. at 640 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court’s entire novel theory rests upon the proposition that there is
something special—something that cannot be justified by normal ‘rational basis’ analysis—in making a disadvantaged group (or a nonpreferred group) resort to a higher
decisionmaking level.”); Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 14, at 1229 (“Romer seems
most nearly understandable as an extension of the Hunter ban on higher-level repeals
to laws protecting homosexuals.”).
160. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
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merely restores the status quo ante.161 But an expansive notion of reliance-adjacent interests also appeared to influence the Romer Court,
potentially rendering even “mere repeal”162 of established rights constitutionally problematic. This “reliance” analysis reflected more than
the question of whether gay, lesbian, and bisexual Coloradans had begun organizing their lives around “specific legal protection[s]”163 previously attained, a strain of reliance protection that motivated the
Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.164
Although that concern was certainly implicit in Romer,165 the Court
fixated instead on Amendment 2’s rejection of an “emerging tradition”
and “consistent pattern”166 on which the affected community, and society in general, may have come to rely: enactment of state and municipal antidiscrimination laws against an ever-expanding list of private
entities not covered by common-law innkeeper duties, for the benefit
of an ever-expanding list of groups lacking suspect-class protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment.167
Because the “Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress a
general power to prohibit discrimination in public accommodations,”168 and given the Court’s own limited application of “heightened
equal protection scrutiny,” 169 the “emerging tradition” and “consistent pattern” was one of expansion only—not contraction—and
Amendment 2 violated that norm.170 The state could not upend that
expectation without running afoul of a theory of equal protection
grounded in non-retrogression themes, particularly given that its actions were so clearly “born of animosity toward the class of persons

161. See Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 14, at 1218, 1229–30 (“The Court sees the
mere repeal of laws or policies beneficial to minorities not as racial discrimination but
as a retreat to a permissible position of neutrality.”).
162. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 390 n.5.
163. Romer, 517 U.S. at 627.
164. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see infra notes
237–49 and accompanying text.
165. Romer, 517 U.S. at 627 (“The change Amendment 2 works in the legal status
of gays and lesbians in the private sphere is far reaching . . . on its own terms . . . .”).
166. Id. at 628.
167. Id. at 627–29 (“[Colorado’s state and municipal laws] set forth an extensive
catalog of traits which cannot be the basis for discrimination, including age, military
status, marital status, pregnancy, parenthood, custody of a minor child, political affiliation, physical or mental disability of an individual or of his or her associates—and, in
recent times, sexual orientation.”).
168. Id. at 628.
169. Id. at 629.
170. Id. at 628.
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affected.”171
2. Perry v. Brown
The Ninth Circuit replicated Romer’s blend of animus and nonretrogression reasoning in Perry v. Brown,172 which considered a ballot measure, Proposition 8, that amended California’s constitution to
eliminate an extant right to same-sex marriage in the state.173 The Supreme Court eventually vacated the Ninth Circuit decision on other
grounds,174 but the case provides a useful case study in non-retrogression analysis. In holding the ballot measure violative of the Equal Protection Clause, the Ninth Circuit appeared to lean heavily on animus
doctrine: “Proposition 8 operates with no apparent purpose but to impose on gays and lesbians, through the public law, a majority’s private
disapproval of them and their relationships.”175 But it was a version of
animus doctrine inflected by non-retrogression themes. For instance,
171. Id. at 634. The Court did not precisely explain why Amendment 2’s short-circuiting of this tradition was of constitutional significance. But a plausible between-thelines reading is that the grant of protection to gays, lesbians, and bisexuals by even a
limited number of municipalities gave rise to a reasonable expectation that the time
had come for statutory coverage. A similar subtext may be inferred, decades later, from
the Court’s affirmation in Bostock v. Clayton County, that Title VII extends to LGBT individuals. See 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). Although, as it had in Romer, the Court avoided
framing its decision in these terms, it again vindicated LGBT Americans’ reliance upon
protection from discrimination in the basic precincts of public and private life. Id. A
majority of the Court may well have agreed that, having recently secured protections
against discrimination in the marriage context in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644
(2015), and in the military context through the statutory repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” as well as the executive rescission of the ban on transgender military service
(halted by the Trump Administration and restored under the Biden Administration),
LGBT individuals could reasonably have expected to be protected against the sort of
employment (and other) discrimination barred under Title VII. See Jim Garamone,
Biden Administration Overturns Transgender Exclusion Policy, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Jan. 25,
2021),
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2482048/
biden-administration-overturns-transgender-exclusion-policy
[https://perma.cc/
2AN4-Y99F]; Press Release, Lloyd J. Austin III, Sec’y of Def., Statement by Secretary of
Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on Transgender Service in the Military (Jan. 25, 2021),
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2481568/statement-bysecretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-transgender-service-in [https://perma.cc/
946E-RWZX] (“[A]ll transgender individuals who wish to serve in the United States
military and can meet the appropriate standards shall be able to do so openly and free
from discrimination.”).
172. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
173. Id. at 1063.
174. The Court held that Proposition 8’s private defenders lacked Article III standing to appeal the district court decision that invalidated the Act. Hollingsworth v. Perry,
570 U.S. 693 (2013).
175. Brown, 671 F.3d at 1095.
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the court cited Romer for the proposition that “the Equal Protection
Clause protects minority groups from being targeted for the deprivation of an existing right without a legitimate reason.”176 And it noted
with disapproval that Proposition 8 had “constitutionalize[d]” the
deprivation at issue: absent judicial intervention, gays and lesbians in
California could unwind the “special disability” imposed on them
“‘only by enlisting the citizenry of [the state] to amend the State Constitution’ for a second time,”177 as opposed to seeking judicial intervention or engaging the ordinary political process. Finally, the court
was unmoved by the gratuitous nature of the withdrawn right, for
Romer had established that “the people of a state may [not] by plebiscite strip a group of a right or benefit, constitutional or otherwise,
that they had previously enjoyed on terms of equality with all others
in the state.”178
3. United States v. Windsor
Another case in the Romer mold is United States v. Windsor, 179
which invalidated the exclusion of same-sex couples from the definition of marriage for purposes of federal law. Applying animus scrutiny, 180 the Supreme Court struck down Section 3 of the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA), as both the legislative history181 and statutory
text182 revealed a bare purpose “to injure” same-sex couples through

176. Id. at 1076 (emphasis added).
177. Id. at 1081 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996)).
178. Id. at 1082 n.14.
179. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
180. The Court restated the rule that “‘a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group.” Id. at 770 (quoting Dep’t
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973)). And for purposes of diagnosing such
animus, the Court observed that ‘“[d]iscriminations of an unusual character’ especially
require careful consideration.” Id. (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633). There is a wealth
of scholarship surrounding rational basis with bite. See Gunther, supra note 33, at 20–
22 (assessing the difference between traditional rational basis review and newer,
more stringent applications of rational basis review); Kenji Yoshino, Why the Court Can
Strike Down Marriage Restrictions Under Rational-Basis Review, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 331, 335 (2013).
181. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 770–71. The Court cited, inter alia, the House Report’s
admission “that DOMA expresses ‘both moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a
moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially
Judeo–Christian) morality.’” Id. at 771 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 12–13
(1996)).
182. Id. at 771 (“Were there any doubt of [the purpose suggested by DOMA’s legislative history], the title of the Act confirms it: The Defense of Marriage.”).
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“interference with the equal dignity of [their] marriages.”183 This conclusion, however, was inseparable from the Court’s treatment of the
reliance interests that DOMA threatened. Subject to constitutional
rights guarantees, marriage regulation had “long been regarded as a
virtually exclusive province of the States”—with the marriage definition “the foundation” of that power.184 DOMA, by “depart[ing] from
this history and tradition of reliance on state law,” could have the effect of “creating two contradictory marriage regimes within the same
State”185 and, in so doing, virtually rescinding the existing marriage
rights recognized by states like New York. DOMA’s departure from tradition therefore undercut “the stability and predictability of basic personal relations the State ha[d] found it proper to acknowledge and
protect.”186
DOMA’s incompatibility with non-retrogression principles helps
explain why, as Justice Scalia observed in dissent, the majority’s explanation was seemingly out of step with ordinary doctrinal categories of
substantive protection.187 But if, as the majority wrote, “the State’s decision to give this class of persons the right to marry conferred upon
them a dignity and status of immense import,”188 and DOMA undercut
the plaintiff’s reliance on that status, then Windsor could be decided
without reaching the ultimate question of whether the constitutional
right to marry extended to same-sex couples.189
4. Non-Retrogression versus Intent-Based Constitutional Doctrines
Some potential advantages of non-retrogression over animus
doctrine are the former’s avoidance of an intent-based inquiry that

183. Id. at 769–70.
184. Id. at 766 (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)).
185. Id. at 768, 772.
186. Id. at 772.
187. Id. at 792–93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (expressing confusion as to whether the
Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause provided the basis for decision).
188. Id. at 768 (majority opinion).
189. See id. at 775 (confining the holding’s coverage to “same-sex marriages made
lawful by [a] State”); see also id. at 811 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Perhaps because they
cannot show that same-sex marriage is a fundamental right under our Constitution,
Windsor and the United States couch their arguments in equal protection terms.”); id.
at 793 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The opinion does not resolve and indeed does not even
mention what had been the central question in this litigation: whether, under the Equal
Protection Clause, laws restricting marriage to a man and a woman are reviewed for
more than mere rationality.”).
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can be extremely difficult to parse and its potential to fortify representation-reinforcement theories of equal protection. 190 First, because
the animus inquiry is largely if not entirely grounded in an investigation of governmental intent, the analysis often turns on subjective and
highly contested assessments of motivation. Indeed, legislatures have
found ways to mask malicious intent with neutral language that makes
it hard for courts to use intent-based doctrines as an effective tool in
rooting out discriminatory motivation.191 For these reasons (among
others), animus can be a shifting standard that leads to inconsistent
(if not contradictory) results.192 Non-retrogression has the advantage
of avoiding those pitfalls while allowing for broader, trans-substantive application.
In a similar vein, Romer presents a missed opportunity for the Supreme Court to underscore the relationship between non-retrogression and the principle of representative reinforcement, as was well
demonstrated in the Colorado Supreme Court’s ruling. The Colorado
court held Amendment 2 unconstitutional not merely for repealing
and prohibiting laws protecting the LGBTQ community from discrimination, but because it procedurally effected a higher-level repeal of
antidiscrimination laws for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.193 This latter
aspect—the requirement that a class appeal to a higher order of protection—is central to a non-retrogression analysis, and one that the
190. John Hart Ely’s theory of representation reinforcement expands on Justice
Stone’s famous Footnote Four from United States v. Carolene Products Co., which identified three kinds of defects in the democratic process that may warrant judicial correction: facial contraventions of specific constitutional prohibitions, restrictions on the
political processes through which undesirable legislation might ordinarily be repealed,
and legislation directed at “discrete and insular minorities.” 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
75–77 (1980). According to Ely, the hallmark of a proper equal protection jurisprudence is the guarantee of access to democratic political processes, not the vindication
of identifiable substantive values. Id. at 73–77, 92. In keeping with this tradition, he
contends that courts in equal protection contexts should mainly confine themselves to
two goals: “clearing the channels of political change” and “correcting certain kinds of
discrimination against minorities.” Id. at 73–75.
191. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving
Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1136 (1997) (arguing that
the intent doctrine “insulates many, if not most, forms of facially neutral state action
from equal protection challenge”); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 747, 764 (2011) (“If legislators have the wit . . . to avoid words like ‘race’ or the
name of a particular racial group in . . . their legislation, the courts will generally apply
ordinary rational basis review. This tendency is true even if the state action has an
egregiously negative impact on a protected group.”).
192. See infra note 431.
193. See infra notes 195–99.
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U.S. Supreme Court largely refused to confront squarely. 194 Instead,
the Romer Court displaced the Colorado court’s intent-indifferent195
analysis, which had turned on the straightforward observation that
“the normal political processes no longer operate to protect these persons.”196 The state’s highest court identified a “fundamental right to
participate equally in the political process” as the common thread woven through a diverse set of precedents concerning reapportionment,
minor party rights, voting rights, and issue-specific departures from
normal legislative procedure.197 Concluding that Amendment 2 probably violated this right—it rendered gays, lesbians, and bisexuals unable “to appeal to state and local government for protection against
discrimination . . . like any other members of the electorate”198—the
court declared the amendment subject to strict scrutiny.199
D. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
The above cases thwarted governmental attempts to revoke
rights via legislation or constitutional amendment, but courts have applied non-retrogression principles in administrative contexts, too. As
noted previously, Mathews v. Eldridge,200 which addressed the question of what process is due before the government may deprive an individual of property via administrative adjudication,201 has come to
stand for the principle that courts must take seriously an individual’s
interest in the status quo before terminating (or seizing) rights and
liberties via legislation or administrative rulemaking upon which that
individual relies.202 A related principle, sounding less in due process

194. See supra notes 151–60 and accompanying text.
195. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1273–75 (Colo. 1993) (declining to take
up the trial court’s invocation of a “right not to have the State endorse and give effect
to private biases”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 959 (1993).
196. Id. at 1285.
197. Id. at 1276–77.
198. Id. at 1286.
199. Id.
200. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see supra notes 22, 110–20 and accompanying text.
201. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 332 (treating the respondent’s “interest . . . in continued
receipt of [Social Security disability] benefits [as] a statutorily created ‘property’ interest protected by the Fifth Amendment”).
202. Id. at 335 (holding that “identification of the specific dictates of due process
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest
that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest”).
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and more in administrative procedure more generally, also has the effect of promoting non-retrogression when applied to agency revocations of rights. As discussed below, this idea is borne out in the Supreme Court’s Regents decision regarding DACA and lower court
rulings striking down regulations preventing foreign nationals who
have accepted public benefits from receiving immigration benefits.203
1. Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of
California
A case in point is Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of
the University of California,204 in which the Court threw out the Trump
Administration’s attempt to rescind the DACA program—announced
several years earlier by the Obama Administration.205 The respondents had mounted an equal protection challenge to the rescission, citing an array of statements from President Trump as evidence of discriminatory animus. 206 While only Justice Sotomayor would have
allowed that claim to proceed,207 a majority of the Court invalidated
the rescission as arbitrary and capricious under the APA.208 Among
the decisive factors209 was the government’s failure to consider, prior
to rescission, whether DACA’s announcement and implementation
had given rise to “legitimate reliance” on its continuation.210 The gov-

203. As noted, the public charge regulations in immigration have since been eliminated by the Biden Administration. See infra note 219.
204. 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
205. Id. at 1901–02 (describing memoranda issued by the Department of Homeland Security in 2012 and 2014 that shielded certain undocumented foreign nationals
who entered the United States as minors from removal and made them eligible for various federal benefits, including work authorization).
206. Id. at 1915–16.
207. Id. at 1917–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“[T]he Court forecloses any challenge to the rescission under the Equal Protection
Clause. I believe that determination is unwarranted on the existing record and premature at this stage of the litigation. I would instead permit respondents to develop their
equal protection claims on remand.”).
208. Id. at 1912–15.
209. The Court also cited the agency’s failure to consider the feasibility of decoupling DACA’s forbearance component from its benefits component, in violation of the
rule of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1911–13 (citing 463 U.S. 29, 37–
38, 43, 46–47, 51 (1983)). In State Farm terms, this failure was comparable to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s total rescission of its either/or passiverestraints policy without consideration of an airbags-only policy. Id.
210. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1913 (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.,
517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996)).
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ernment attempted to justify that omission on the theory that the original DACA Memorandum’s disclaimer of substantive rights and notice
of impermanence had prevented any “legally cognizable reliance interests” from taking root. 211 But the Court rebuffed this argument,
concluding that it had been the government’s responsibility to establish “in the first instance” why any potential reliance interests were
entitled to little or no weight.212 Because the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) had failed to engage that inquiry, the Court invalidated
DACA’s rescission under the general rule that, “[w]hen an agency
changes course . . . it must ‘be cognizant that longstanding policies
may have engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken
into account.’”213 This line of reasoning prevailed in spite of the Attorney General’s prior determination that DACA was contrary to law and
always had been—a finding the Attorney General “of course” had
power to render.214 Thus, notwithstanding the Court’s formal rejection of respondents’ substantive claim, non-retrogression principles
had a powerful practical impact on DACA recipients’ effective legal
footing vis-à-vis the government.
2. Public Charge Cases
Shifting from the deportation to the naturalization context, immigrants likely to become “public charge[s]” have been considered inadmissible to the United States and ineligible for permanent residency
for as long as immigration has been a subject of comprehensive federal regulation.215 In guidance promulgated in 1999, the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) clarified that the “public
charge” category encompasses only those individuals “likely to become primarily dependent on the government for subsistence.” 216
This formulation expressly excluded supplemental assistance for
food, healthcare, or housing—a policy choice “consistent with over a

211. Id. (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioners at 16–17, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (Nos. 18-587, 18-588, 18-589)).
212. Id. at 1913–14.
213. Id. at 1913 (quoting Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 222
(2016)).
214. Id. at 1903, 1910.
215. See City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 981 F.3d
742, 749 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Immigration Act of 1882, Pub. L. No. 47-376, 22 Stat.
214 (1882)).
216. Id. (quoting Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public
Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,689 (May 26, 1999)).
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century of judicial and administrative decisions interpreting the public charge bar.”217 In 2019, however, DHS broke with this longstanding
tradition, broadening “public charge” to include anyone likely to receive non-cash supplemental assistance from the federal government
for a specified period of time.218 Before the Biden Administration reversed this policy in 2021,219 the policy was invalidated by the federal
courts. In City and County of San Francisco v. USCIS,220 the Ninth Circuit
deemed this policy shift arbitrary and capricious.221 Beyond faulting
DHS’s threadbare examination of the fiscal and public-health consequences of the new policy, 222 the court found that the agency had
failed to explain why the findings underpinning the old standard no
longer held true—a failure that took on extra weight given the “‘serious reliance interests’ engendered by over two decades of reliance on
the [1999] Guidance.”223
The court did not articulate precisely what reliance interests DHS
had threatened by upsetting the “longstanding, settled understanding”224 of the public charge concept. But a societal dependance on the
abandoned definition is visible in DHS’s insistence that states and municipalities could soften the anticipated fiscal impacts by “reforming
their operations.”225 Likewise, the threat to individuals who had organized their lives in reliance on the subsistence standard is evident in
the court’s explanation that, under the new policy, “a single mother
with young children who DHS foresees as likely to participate in three
[non-cash federal assistance] programs for four months could not get
a green card.”226 The court did not absolutely preclude revocation of
217. Id. at 761.
218. Id. at 749.
219. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., Public Charge Letter
to Interagency Partners (Apr. 12, 2021) https://www.uscis.gov/sites/
default/files/document/notices/SOPDD-Letter-to-USCIS-Interagency-Partners-on
-Public-Charge.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6KV-LSRN] (“The 2019 public charge rule is no
longer in effect . . . . Continuing to defend the 2019 Public Charge Rule . . . was neither
in the public interest nor an efficient use of limited government resources.”).
220. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 981 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2020).
221. Id. at 762; accord Cook Cnty. v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 208, 228–29, 233 (7th Cir.
2020); New York v. U.S. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., 969 F.3d 42, 74–81, 88 (2d Cir. 2020).
Contra CASA de Md., Inc. v. Trump, 971 F.3d 220, 245, 256 (4th Cir. 2020). For further
discussion, see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
222. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 981 F.3d at 760.
223. Id. at 761 (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515
(2009)).
224. Id. at 753.
225. Id. at 754.
226. Id. at 749.
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qualifying immigrants’ long-established entitlement to supplemental
assistance, but DHS needed a “more detailed justification” to give it
effect.227 San Francisco thus further demonstrates the arbitrary-andcapricious standard’s non-retrogressive impact.
3. Non-Retrogression and the Process/Substance Tension in the
APA
To the extent that non-retrogression analysis spans both procedural tests under the APA and procedural due process, it highlights an
important extent to which both sets of arguments can serve as “surrogates” for substantive judicial review courts are less willing to engage.228 Indeed, immigration scholars have long understood how substantive constitutional claims are mediated through the lens of
process.229 More generally, courts have often invoked process as the
basis for more muscular review of governmental action in an array of
substantive arenas that commonly require large amounts of deference. 230 This approach may be attributable to the judiciary’s own
overreach concerns: on this view, procedural arguments avoid “judicial encroachment upon the [substantive] purview of the political
branches.”231
Indeed, one finds a broad overlap of procedural and substantive
grounds throughout the lower court DACA rescission cases. The rationales include a failure to engage in interagency dialogue, providing
scant legal justification for administrative action, and other blatant

227. Id. at 761 (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515
(2009)). The Second Circuit reached a similar result in New York v. U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 969 F.3d 42, 82 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[W]here, as here, DHS anchors its
decision to change its interpretation in the perceived shortcomings of the prior interpretation, and then fails to identify any actual defect, it has not provided a ‘reasoned
explanation’ for its actions . . . .”), as did the Seventh Circuit in Cook County v. Wolf, 962
F.3d 208, 233 (7th Cir. 2020) (“DHS did not adequately consider the reliance interests
of state and local governments . . . .”).
228. See Motomura, supra note 15, at 1629–30.
229. Id. at 1630 (noting that strategically framing immigration claims through a
procedural lens “greatly enhances the likelihood that a constitutional challenge to an
immigration decision will succeed”).
230. See supra notes 114–20 and accompanying text; see also Joseph Landau, Muscular Procedure: Conditional Deference in the Executive Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L.
REV. 661, 675–98 (2009) (noting how procedural devices such as discovery, standards
of review, evidentiary requirements, and procedural due process have been instrumental to resolving major national security cases after 9/11).
231. Motomura, supra note 15, at 1646.
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process flaws.232 Some lower courts have gone further, inferring animus from the combination of both the policy’s disparate impact on
Latinx persons (and Mexicans in particular)233 and its unusual procedural history.234
E. STARE DECISIS
Even where the Court remains committed in substance to its earlier announcement of a right, the doctrine of stare decisis advances
non-retrogression principles by raising the degree of difficulty in uprooting established protections. In this way, non-retrogression may
reinforce the rationale for reaffirmation—a case in point being
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 235 Casey,
and to a somewhat lesser extent Dickerson v. United States,236 exemplify how Supreme Court Justices invoke various norms associated
with non-retrogression—including reliance interests, respect for the
current state of constitutional culture, and vaguer concepts of judicial
administrability, orderliness, and manageability—to lock in place judicial decisions they would not have initially supported.
1. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
In Casey, a plurality of the Court reaffirmed the “central holding”

232. See W. Neil Eggleston & Amanda Elbogen, The Trump Administration and the
Breakdown of Intra-Executive Legal Process, 127 YALE L.J.F. 825, 844 (2018). Courts
have found the Trump Administration’s arguments for rescinding DACA to be “based
on a flawed legal premise” and otherwise lacking in a “reasoned explanation.” Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1037, 1044–45 (N.D.
Cal. 2018) (noting that the government never substantiated its conclusion that DACA
was illegal or improperly adopted by Congress); see also Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279
F. Supp. 3d 401, 420 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (granting nationwide injunction and noting that
plaintiffs would likely succeed on the merits of their challenge given a string of procedural flaws underling the DACA rescission policy), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
233. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 298 F. Supp. 3d 1304,
1314–15 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (decision granting in part and denying in part government’s
motion to dismiss).
234. After reaffirming DACA only months before its rescission, the program was
then “hurriedly cast aside on what seems to have been a contrived excuse . . . suggest[ing] that the normal care and consideration within the agency was bypassed.” Id.
at 1315. Such a “strange about-face, done at lightning speed” and in conjunction with
the President’s repeated and documented expressions of disparagement toward immigrants, indicated that the DACA rescission policy was motivated by a discriminatory
purpose. Id.
235. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
236. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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of Roe v. Wade237 that “a State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability.” 238 Of course, it would be an overstatement to describe Casey
solely as a non-retrogression decision, given the Court’s defense of the
liberty and equality interests that underpin a pregnant person’s right
to choose. 239 But a complementary aspect of the Court’s reasoning
acknowledged the separate and independent significance of safeguarding the status quo through a conception of stare decisis240 that
drew fire from the dissenting Justices.241
In keeping with abortion’s place among “the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,”242 the Court’s stare
decisis inquiry focused less on the internal integrity of the Court’s decisions over time—a standard feature of stare decisis jurisprudence—
and more on the need to protect individuals who had acted in reliance
on Roe from “serious inequity.”243 And it defined this personal interest
broadly, declining to “limit cognizable reliance to specific instances of
sexual activity.” 244 Instead, in finding that the reliance interests
weighed heavily in favor of reaffirming Roe, the Court accounted for
the fact that “for two decades of economic and social developments,
people have organized intimate relationships and made choices that
define their views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance
on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception should
fail.”245 This capacious formulation of individual reliance reinforces,

237. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
238. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879.
239. See id. at 852 (“[T]he liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the
human condition and so unique to the law. The mother who carries a child to full term
is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear.”).
240. Id. at 853. (“[T]he reservations any of us may have in reaffirming the central
holding of Roe are outweighed by the explication of individual liberty we have given
combined with the force of stare decisis.”).
241. See id. at 944, 957 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the joint opinion for
“its newly minted variation on stare decisis” couched in “generalized assertions about
the national psyche”).
242. Id. at 851 (majority opinion).
243. Id. at 855.
244. Id. at 856.
245. Id.
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and draws force from, the Court’s broader concerns with social stability 246 and preoccupation with its own reputation. 247 But it also
stretches further into the domain of non-retrogression by emphasizing rights revocation as a kind of independent harm. As Casey’s opening line intones: “Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of
doubt.”248 Likewise, social stability and judicial integrity are elusive
where rights are easily revocable.
2. Dickerson v. United States
In Dickerson v. United States,249 the Court confirmed the continuing validity of the rule of Miranda v. Arizona,250 which requires certain
warnings to be given if a criminal suspect’s statements are to be admitted into evidence.251 After dispensing with the government’s argument that the Miranda Court did not intend to announce a constitutional rule, 252 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that stare decisis
prevented its abrogation: “Whether or not we would agree with Miranda’s reasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing the issue
in the first instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily
against overruling it now.”253 Finding no “special justification”254 for
deviating from these principles, the Court emphasized something resembling a societal reliance interest: “Miranda has become embedded
in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture.”255 Along these lines, with virtually
no original analysis of the question and little evident enthusiasm, the
Court reaffirmed that the Constitution mandates Miranda warnings.256 Dickerson could therefore demand suppression of a statement
246. See id. at 867 (“[T]he Court’s interpretation of the Constitution [in a case like
Roe] calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division
by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.”).
247. See id. at 866 (“The legitimacy of the Court would fade with the frequency of
its vacillation.”).
248. Id. at 844.
249. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
250. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
251. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431–32.
252. Id. at 437–38.
253. Id. at 443.
254. Id. (quoting United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996)).
255. Id.
256. See id. at 433, 435 (citing “the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” as the “two constitutional bases for the requirement that a confession be voluntary to be admitted into
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he had given to FBI interrogators257 because an earlier Court had empowered suspects in his position to do so, and because suspects and
society in general had come to rely on that right’s continuing availability.
3. Contrasting Non-Retrogression with Stare Decisis
As these cases illustrate, there are obvious and impactful areas of
overlap between stare decisis and non-retrogression. At a very high
level of generality, both principles promote consistency, stability, and
predictability 258 —instilling a predisposition in courts to find that
whatever was, and is, should continue to be. There is also frequent
overlap between the interests each principle seeks to promote, particularly a shared concern for reliance interests among affected persons.259
However, the two principles are neither coextensive nor interchangeable: each extends beyond the other’s scope and (depending on
the circumstances) may either reinforce or undercut the other’s mission. Stare decisis, of course, applies in a multitude of situations where
the rescission of prior rights is not at issue. 260 Likewise, non-retrogression may produce a result in the absence of a prior decision re-

evidence,” and explaining that Miranda rested on the conclusion “that the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation blurs the line between voluntary and involuntary
statements”).
257. Before trial, Dickerson moved to suppress a statement he had made at a Federal Bureau of Investigation field office, on the grounds that he had not received Miranda warnings before being interrogated. See id. at 432.
258. See June Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134 (2020) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring).
259. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (citing the fact that, since Roe, people had acted “in reliance on the availability of abortion”
in its decision to reaffirm Roe); June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2134–35 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (noting the role of reliance interests in determining whether precedent
should be overturned); Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443 (noting that Miranda had become
“part of our national culture” in determining that no special circumstances sufficient
to overturn Miranda’s precedent existed).
260. See, e.g., Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n., 502 U.S. 197, 201–03 (1991) (invoking stare decisis to reaffirm that the Federal Employers’ Liability Act authorizes suit
for damages of state-owned railroads); Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020) (relying
on stare decisis in the context of copyright infringement); Gamble v. United States, 139
S. Ct. 1960 (2019) (holding that the criminal defendant did not bring sufficient grounds
to overrule 170 years of precedent holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause allows
successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns); Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term
Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1 (2000) (relying on stare decisis for statutory interpretation of 28
U.S.C. § 1331 as incorporated into the Medicare Act).
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quiring that result, and even in contravention of a prior decision favoring the opposite result. This misalignment ultimately derives from
a fundamental difference in outlook. While stare decisis is often
couched in terms of external interests like reliance, its ultimate aims
reflect inwards: it is the means through which the judiciary protects
its own institutional legitimacy, “avoid[ing] . . . arbitrary discretion in
the courts”261 and insulating its learned distinction from “the political
and legislative process.” 262 Non-retrogression, by contrast, is motivated less by institutionalism than by concern for a bundle of externally oriented rule-of-law values and civic expectations.
Thus, for example, when the Supreme Court protected Dreamers
from the Administration’s sudden cancellation of the DACA program
in Regents, it honored the principle that law should be sturdy enough
to withstand the arbitrary whims of shifting administrative personnel, 263 and that foreign nationals who lack the same constitutional
protections as citizens are still entitled to organize their lives around
the expectation that government will keep its word. 264 Similarly,
Romer embodies the Dworkinian notion that integrity in judicial interpretation demands the “coherent and principled extension of past political decisions even when judges profoundly disagree about what
this means.”265 Not only did the Romer Court accommodate reasonable reliance interests and guard against the civic whiplash induced by
the rescission of recently bestowed rights, it also assimilated a vulnerable group within an “emerging tradition” and “consistent pattern” of
incremental expansion in antidiscrimination protections. 266 That it
did so despite a line of case law vigorously opposing the judicial derivation of LGBTQ rights267 suggests a crucial distinction between nonretrogression and stare decisis: non-retrogression may promote the
“emerging tradition” of rights expansion where stare decisis would
tend to thwart social change.
Of course, this is not to say that the doctrines always work at
261. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2134 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)).
262. Id. (quoting Robert H. Jackson, Decisional Law and Stare Decisis, 30 A.B.A. J.
334, 334 (1944)).
263. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 204–14 and accompanying text.
265. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 134 (1986).
266. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 628 (1996).
267. See id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of “contradict[ing]” its
holding in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a Georgia anti-sodomy
law as applied exclusively to same-sex conduct, “a decision, unchallenged here, pronounced only 10 years ago”)).
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cross-purposes: where the tenets of stare decisis favor a preexisting
right holder, non-retrogression is still available to provide justificatory power. This dynamic is best exemplified by Casey, where the
Court appears to have rejected a “jurisprudence of doubt” not merely
for the sake of internal consistency, but to avoid the “serious inequity”
that would result from liberty’s contraction.268 In such cases, a stare
decisis doctrine stripped of the non-retrogression principle cannot
fully capture the Court’s motivations.
Beyond their limitations in applicability and purpose, the two
principles also diverge in substance. The doctrinal limitations of stare
decisis are well-defined, even as cases testing those limitations often
incite ardent disagreement.269 Those limitations: the Supreme Court
may overturn precedent only when “some special justification” warrants such a departure.270 That justification must go “beyond whether
the [preceding] case was decided correctly,” instead looking to factors
such as the prior decision’s administrability, any “subsequent factual
and legal developments,” and, once again, any reliance interests it has
induced.271
Non-retrogression’s outer bounds have not been so neatly articulated. Because it has often operated as something of a stealth doctrine,272 informing decisions without express attribution, there is no

268. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844, 855 (1992).
269. Indeed, this controversy itself supplies an important functional difference between stare decisis and non-retrogression. Stare decisis is, as is well-documented, a
profoundly controversial doctrine, at least in practice. It is often invoked in culturally
impactful cases in which the Court, and the country, are bitterly divided. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 465 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Far from believing that stare decisis compels this result, I believe we cannot allow to remain on the
books even a celebrated decision—especially a celebrated decision—that has come to
stand for the proposition that the Supreme Court has power to impose extraconstitutional constraints upon Congress and the States. This is not the system that was established by the Framers, or that would be established by any sane supporter of government by the people.” (second emphasis added)). It is a concept that judicial nominees
are routinely asked about in confirmation hearings. See Mary Ziegler, The Secret Code
of the Amy Coney Barrett Hearing, ATLANTIC (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.theatlantic
.com/ideas/archive/2020/10/secret-code-senate-confirmation-hearings/616704
[https://perma.cc/D96C-J8BL]. It is, for lack of a more elegant term, a “hot-button” issue. Non-retrogression, for better or worse, is not. This likely has practical implications
for how and when it can be applied, particularly where it is applied silently.
270. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 429.
271. June Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134 (2020) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
272. Cf. Eric Berger, Lawrence’s Stealth Constitutionalism and Same-Sex Marriage
Litigation, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765 (2013).
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body of caselaw explicitly articulating its rules of engagement. If anything, it may function as a legal chameleon—taking on the guise of the
doctrine it sits atop in any given instance. In a case invoking stare decisis, that may indeed be stare decisis doctrine. In a case where nonretrogression is animated through administrative concerns, it may be
the rules articulated through the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). 273 Or alternatively, non-retrogression may reveal itself
through preemption doctrine274 or animus analysis.275 Finally, it may
don the resilient cloak of its forebears, including the all-but-immovable property-like nature of the vested rights doctrine276 or the robust
protections afforded under procedural due process.277
F. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A final application of the Court’s concern for non-retrogression
principles arises in court decisions of statutory interpretation. As explored below, the doctrine of ratification (or legislative reenactment)
as well as clear statement rules illustrate an important sense in which
judicial underenforcement of equality norms,278 combined with a respect for the status quo, may both encourage progress while freezing
it in place: by delegating the doling out of such rights to the political
branches, and then erecting procedural barriers to retrogression,279
courts may effectively permit progressive regimes to make new rights
more freely than their less-progressive successors can unmake them.
1. Congressional Ratification
A prime example is Lorillard, Division of Loew’s Theatres, Inc. v.
Pons,280 in which the Court recognized a right to a jury trial in private
actions under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of

273. See supra notes 204–27 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 121–41 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 142–99 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 54–90 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 99–120 and accompanying text.
278. See Sager, supra note 34, at 1227 (suggesting that if the Supreme Court is in a
weak position to fully enforce certain constitutional norms, the political branches have
the prerogative to more fully enforce those norms, “regulat[ing] . . . behavior by standards more severe than those imposed by the federal judiciary”).
279. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976) (citing, among other
authorities, Friendly, supra note 105 (evaluating the extent to which Due Process procedural barriers should constrain administrative actors)).
280. Lorillard, Div. of Loew’s Theatres, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
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1967,281 despite the lack of express statutory authorization282 or unambiguous guidance in the legislative history. 283 For a unanimous
Court, Justice Marshall inferred the existence of the contested right
from the long-established private right to a jury trial under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 284 In enacting ADEA’s enforcement
scheme, Congress had sought to duplicate much of the existing FLSA
framework—with targeted variations where a new approach was
deemed necessary. 285 The Court construed this “selectivity” to
“strongly suggest[] that but for those changes Congress expressly
made, it intended to incorporate fully the remedies and procedures of
the FLSA”286—including the private right to a jury trial.287 This construction reflected a modification of the presumption that Congress is
aware of and adopts “an administrative or judicial interpretation of a
statute . . . when it re-enacts [the] statute without change.” 288 Here,
although Congress had enacted a new law, it incorporated preexisting
statutory provisions with long-settled meaning. In such circumstances, the Court concluded that “Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute.” 289 The
upshot of these complementary presumptions is that a court’s statutory interpretation has significant staying power, perhaps even extending beyond the confines of the statute it interprets—unless and
until Congress musters enough votes to disavow it. Therefore, where
a settled statutory interpretation validates an individual right, as was
the case in Lorillard, ratification doctrine serves non-retrogression
ends.

281. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1970 & Supp. V).
282. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 577 (“[T]he ADEA contains no provision expressly granting a right to jury trial . . . .”).
283. Id. at 582 n.10 (“Senator Javits made the only specific reference in the legislative history to a jury trial. . . . It is difficult to tell whether Senator Javits was referring
to the issue in ADEA cases . . . .”).
284. 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq; see Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580 (“Long before Congress
enacted the ADEA, it was well established that there was a right to a jury trial in private
actions pursuant to the FLSA. Indeed, every court to consider the issue had so held.”).
285. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 581 (“[I]n enacting the ADEA, Congress exhibited both a
detailed knowledge of the FLSA provisions and their judicial interpretation and a willingness to depart from those provisions regarded as undesirable or inappropriate for
incorporation.”).
286. Id. at 582.
287. See id. at 582–83.
288. Id. at 580.
289. Id. at 581.
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Another example of the interaction between ratification and nonretrogression is Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs
v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,290 which held that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act (FHA).291 The
plaintiffs filed suit under FHA Sections 804(a)292 and 805(a),293 alleging that the state agency responsible for the distribution of federal
low-income housing credits had disproportionately allocated credits
to developers in predominantly Black urban areas, entrenching segregated housing patterns.294 In allowing this disparate-impact claim to
proceed, the Court made two relevant observations. First, the relevant
FHA language closely resembled language in both Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the ADEA that the Court had already interpreted to support disparate-impact liability.295 Second, in 1988, Congress reenacted the relevant FHA language with knowledge that nine
Courts of Appeals had unanimously construed it to support disparateimpact claims296 —“convincing support for the conclusion that Congress accepted and ratified” an identical construction.297 On the basis

290. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519
(2015).
291. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.; Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 576 U.S. at 545–46.
292. Section 804(a) provides that it is unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the
making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
293. Section 805(a) provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person or other
entity whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions
to discriminate against any person in making available such a transaction, or in the
terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap,
familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a).
294. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 576 U.S. at 526.
295. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (interpreting Title VII’s
“otherwise adversely affect” language to establish disparate-impact liability); Smith v.
City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (interpreting identical language in the ADEA to
accomplish the same). Taken together, the Court interpreted Griggs and Smith to mean
that “antidiscrimination laws must be construed to encompass disparate-impact
claims when their text refers to the consequences of actions,” assuming no inconsistency with statutory purpose. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 576 U.S. at 533. The FHA’s
“otherwise make unavailable” language satisfied this test, in that “the operative text
looks to results.” Id. at 534.
296. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 576 U.S. at 535–36.
297. Id.
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of these observations,298 the Court ruled disparate-impact claims cognizable under the FHA,299 with clear non-retrogression implications.
Lower-court recognition of a purported statutory right, plus a subsequent act of implicit ratification by Congress, had served to constrain
the Supreme Court’s assessment of the right’s claimed existence—as
had the Court’s own inference of a similar right in adjacent statutory
contexts. The effect was to ensure FHA plaintiffs’ continued access to
a powerful theory of liability capable of “counteract[ing] unconscious
prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy classification as disparate treatment.” 300 Sounding an additional non-retrogression
theme, the Court noted toward the end of the opinion: “In light of the
longstanding judicial interpretation of the FHA to encompass disparate-impact claims and congressional reaffirmation of that result, residents and policymakers have come to rely on the availability of disparate-impact claims.” 301 Indeed, something like a civic reliance
interest had sprung up around disparate-impact liability in the period
between the lower federal courts’ initial treatment of the issue and the
Supreme Court’s validation of their findings.
The Court took a similar approach in Bank of America Corp. v. City
of Miami,302 relying on principles of stare decisis and ratification to
confirm Miami’s standing to bring suit under the FHA. 303 The city
claimed that two defendant banks’ racially discriminatory lending
practices had led to disproportionately high foreclosure rates among
minority borrowers, which in turn both reduced tax revenue and increased the need for municipal services to remedy the resulting setbacks.304 To satisfy the Court’s statutory standing requirement, Miami
needed to demonstrate that the alleged harms were “arguably within

298. The rule of superfluity also influenced the Court’s analysis, in that the FHA’s
1988 amendments included certain carveouts from liability that would be superfluous
unless disparate-impact liability were the statutory default. Id. at 537–39. And the
Court separately assessed and confirmed disparate-impact liability’s consistency with
the FHA’s purpose to “eradicate discriminatory practices within a sector of our Nation’s economy.” Id. at 539–45.
299. Id. at 545–46.
300. Id. at 540. The Court constrained the effect of its holding somewhat by requiring that a plaintiff whose disparate-impact claim is based on a statistical disparity identify a “policy or policies causing that disparity.” Id. at 542–43.
301. Id. at 546.
302. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Mia., 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017).
303. Id. at 1305.
304. Id. at 1301–02.
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the zone of interests” that Congress intended the FHA to protect.305
The FHA empowers any “aggrieved person”—that is, “any person who
. . . claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice”—to bring suit under its provisions. 306 And the Court had long
read that category307 broadly, construing it to encompass, for example, white tenants deprived of the benefits of interracial association by
discriminatory rental practices,308 a village deprived of tax revenue
and racial balance by racial-steering practices,309 and a nonprofit organization drained of resources by its fight against housing discrimination.310 Moreover, when Congress reenacted the relevant FHA language in 1988, it acted with knowledge of these holdings 311 —a
sequence the Court interpreted to indicate congressional ratification
of the proposition that “plaintiffs similarly situated to [Miami] have a
cause of action under the FHA.”312 As in Inclusive Communities Project,
the Court took care to narrow the right it recognized—specifically, by
requiring more than mere foreseeability to establish proximate
cause.313 Nonetheless, Bank of America further exemplifies ratification
doctrine’s non-retrogressive impact: reenactment of an ambiguous
statute ratifies prior judicial pronouncements on the rights contained
therein, which in turn stymies revocation absent a congressional
about-face.
2. Clear Statement Rules
Principles of non-retrogression have also loomed large where
courts have invoked clear statement rules in statutory interpretation.
In immigration, the Supreme Court has required Congress to manifest
a clear and unambiguous intent before terminating core rights such as
access to courts and protection from deportation relief upon which
immigrants and their families have long relied. In Immigration and

305. Id. at 1302–03 (emphasis removed) (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)).
306. Id. at 1303 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i)).
307. Technically, the category of “aggrieved person” had been “person aggrieved”
prior to a 1988 amendment. Id. The main precedents establishing the breadth of the
FHA’s zone of interests interpreted the pre-1988 terminology.
308. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209–12 (1972).
309. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 110–11 (1979).
310. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982).
311. Bank of Am., 137 S. Ct. at 1303–04.
312. Id. at 1303.
313. Id. at 1305; see supra notes 290–301 and accompanying text.
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Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr, 314 the Court interpreted two statutes—the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)315
and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA)316—to preserve the status quo in the face of congressional
measures expanding the range of deportable offenses,317 curbing judicial review of various immigration-related cases, 318 and eliminating
avenues for relief from deportation.319
Non-retrogression was especially important with respect to one
provision in particular—Section 340(b) of IIRIRA—which eliminated
a form of deportation relief for foreign nationals convicted of certain
offenses, including aggravated felonies, drug offenses, specific weapons or national security violations, or multiple crimes of moral turpitude. 320 St. Cyr held that, absent unambiguous congressional intent,
this provision was inapplicable to foreign nationals who, having
pleaded guilty to enumerated offenses prior to the law’s effective date,
were no longer eligible for relief from deportation.321 Informed by “familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled
expectations,” 322 the Court held that IIRIRA was inapplicable in the
case of plea agreements taken prior to the law’s effective date given
the important reliance interests of foreign nationals who enter plea
314. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
315. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
316. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
317. See 1 CHARLES GORDON & STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§§ 2.04[14][b][vi], [14][c] (2012).
318. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW
AND POLICY 22 (5th ed. 2009).
319. Section 440(d) of AEDPA identified a broad set of offenses for which convictions make a foreign national ineligible for discretionary waiver of deportation. 110
Stat. at 1277 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)). Section 304-240B(b) of IIRIRA, 110 Stat.
at 3009-597, repealed Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994), which bestowed broad discretion upon the Attorney
General to grant deportation waivers. Section 304(b) also replaced this relief with a
narrower cancellation of removal provision, 110 Stat. at 3009-594 (creating 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229(b)). This provision gives the Attorney General discretion to cancel removal for
only a narrow class of foreign nationals. Id. A foreign national convicted of any aggravated felony is ineligible for cancellation of removal. Id.
320. IIRIRA § 304-240A(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-594; Immigr. & Naturalization Serv.
v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001).
321. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314–26. The respondent, a lawful permanent resident,
pleaded guilty to sale of a controlled substance—an aggravated felony—prior to the
effective date of IIRIRA. Id. at 293. Because the agency did not initiate deportation proceedings until after the law took effect, St. Cyr was apparently no longer eligible for a
discretionary wavier of deportation. Id.
322. Id. at 321 (quoting Landgraf v. Usi Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994)).
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agreements with a “belief in their continued eligibility for . . . [immigration] relief.”323 In “[t]he absence of a clearly expressed statement
of congressional intent,” 324 interpreting IIRIRA to eliminate discretionary waivers of deportation for those who pleaded guilty prior to
the law’s taking effect would create a significant “potential for unfairness” for foreign nationals who relied “upon settled practice, the advice of counsel, and perhaps even assurances in open court that the
entry of the plea would not foreclose [discretionary] relief.”325
The principle of non-retrogression played a prominent role
within a second aspect of St. Cyr, where the Court, again applying clear
statement rules, found that Congress’s stripping of judicial review
within the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) did not alter preexisting habeas relief. 326 Although the government noted that AEDPA
plainly called for the “elimination of . . . habeas corpus,”327 the Court
preserved it, ruling that AEDPA did not displace general habeas relief
under another statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241.328 In protecting court access
for deportable foreign nationals, the Court provided institutional and
historical—if not constitutional—rationales for preserving the status
quo. First, the Court required a clear statement of congressional intent
to repeal habeas jurisdiction.329 Moreover, “[h]abeas courts . . . regularly answered questions of law that arose in the context of discretionary relief,” and given that important tradition, the Court refused to
find that the elimination of a more specific habeas corpus provision in
the INA worked a general habeas strip under the conventional habeas
statute.330 Seeking to avoid “a departure from historical practice in immigration law,” the Court preserved the writ given its longstanding

323. Id.; see id. at 325 (“Prior to AEDPA and IIRIRA, [foreign nationals] like St. Cyr
had a significant likelihood of receiving . . . relief. . . . [And] respondent, and other [foreign nationals] like him, almost certainly relied upon that likelihood in deciding
whether to forgo their right to a trial . . . .”).
324. Id. at 314.
325. Id. at 323.
326. Id. at 298–314.
327. Id. at 308.
328. Id. at 298, 314 (rejecting the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s argument that jurisdiction to hear St. Cyr’s habeas petition was repealed by the AEDPA and
IIRIRA).
329. Id. at 299, 305 (“[W]hen a particular interpretation of a statute invokes the
outer limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended
that result.”).
330. Id. at 307, 310.
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fixture as something that “has always been available to review the legality of Executive detention.”331
3. Political Branch Constitutional Enforcement
These cases of statutory interpretation are just some of the avenues through which the political branches are empowered—through
positive and negative action—to further non-retrogressive ends. Congress and the executive may use their respective legislative and administrative tools to forge other paths to expand enforcement of constitutional norms, particularly when the judiciary elects not to enforce
those norms to their full constitutional limit.332 The non-retrogression
principle paves the way for rights expansions to occur in this manner,
while simultaneously erecting roadblocks to any political branch efforts to diminish rights.333
Of course, non-retrogression need not be limited to instances
where the political branches have elected to fully enforce rights (as in
the case of non-discrimination statutes). It may also activate as a bulwark to political branch efforts at rescinding or diminishing rights, as
reflected in St. Cyr’s response to AEDPA and IIRIRA. 334 In either instance, non-retrogression has a role to play. But it is perhaps most impactful in scenarios where the courts have limited the bite, scope, or
enforcement of constitutional equality norms, leaving gaps for the political branches to fill by extending rights through legislative or regulatory channels.
At a glance, this model would seem to have obvious vulnerabilities. Without judicial support, are not political expansions of rights under one regime subject to regressive reversal by its successors? The

331. Id. at 305.
332. See Sager, supra note 34.
333. Of course, the political branches typically cannot enforce the Constitution beyond the Court’s calibration. See Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (invalidating portions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act that sought to enforce First
Amendment norms in contravention of prior Supreme Court caselaw and remarking
that Congress can “enforce a constitutional right” but cannot “chang[e] what the right
is”); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88–91 (2000) (holding that Congress’s
attempt to abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity for Age Discrimination in
Employment Act violations exceeded its constitutional authority to remedy substantive rights violations and was instead an improper attempt to “substantively redefine
the States’ legal obligations with respect to age discrimination”); Bd. of Trustees of
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (similar holding as Kimel with respect to
the Americans with Disabilities Act). By contrast, non-retrogression can activate even
earlier, at the moment rights appear subject to revocation. See infra Part IV.B.
334. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 289.
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answer to that question is, of course, yes—they are. But this is why
non-retrogression is potentially so powerful: it supplies the judicial
support necessary to obstruct this dynamic. Thus, where courts may,
for example, allow their application of the Equal Protection Clause to
be “significantly informed” by “institutional concerns” that temper
their functional enforcement of the Clause, 335 non-retrogression offers a subtler mechanism for them to safeguard other branches’ efforts
to give full voice to Equal Protection.336 In other words, even where
courts may not have the conviction to do so themselves, non-retrogression encourages other branches to carry the torch—not just by
affording them space to make progress on the front end, but by supplying judicial reinforcement of that progress on the back end.
III. NON-RETROGRESSION’S LIMITS
Notwithstanding non-retrogression’s prevalence and reach, the
Supreme Court has not always applied it, or—worse—it has merely
paid lip service to its broader ideals while altering the underlying legal
rule to apply in future cases. In constitutional cases involving abortion
and Miranda rights, the Court has espoused the institution-affirming
“pragmatic benefits” of stare decisis all the while gutting those hallowed cases of their core meaning and import.337 In statutory voting
rights cases, the Court’s overriding commitment to other constitutional values has produced decisions that undermine the non-retrogressive principles embedded within the very heart of the statute.338
A. DILUTING ABORTION AND MIRANDA RIGHTS
1. Abortion Rights
In June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo,339 the Court assessed the
constitutionality of a Louisiana statute340 requiring abortion providers to maintain local hospital admitting privileges.341 Only four years

335. Sager, supra note 34, at 1217–18 (defining “institutional concerns” as those
informed by the “propriety or capacity” of courts to enforce a provision, as distinguished from “analytical,” substantive interpretations of a provision’s actual meaning).
336. See, e.g., supra notes 162–71, 205 and accompanying text.
337. See, e.g., June Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment).
338. See infra notes 370–87 and accompanying text.
339. 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
340. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(A)(2)(a) (West 2020).
341. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2112.
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earlier, in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,342 the Court had struck
down a “nearly identical” Texas statute under Casey’s undue burden
standard—a chronology that Chief Justice Roberts found dispositive
notwithstanding his continuing disagreement with the earlier result.343 Concurring in the judgment in June Medical, Roberts reiterated
his objections to the reasoning of the Whole Woman’s Health majority
(now reduced to four by Justice Kennedy’s departure) 344 but concluded that stare decisis required invalidation of the Louisiana statute.345 While conceding that “[s]tare decisis is not an ‘inexorable command,’” 346 Roberts suggested that only “special circumstances” can
justify departure from the general mandate “to treat like cases
alike.”347 That is, whatever his feelings about the reasoning in Whole
Woman’s Health, he insisted that, “for precedent to mean anything,
[stare decisis] must give way only to a rationale that goes beyond
whether the case was decided correctly.”348
But the Chief Justice’s emphasis on the importance of adhering to
precedent in this single case did not assure consistency or stability in
the Court’s abortion jurisprudence. Despite Roberts’s professed allegiance to prior cases, his June Medical concurrence watered down the
standard of review for abortion restrictions in a way that makes it almost unrecognizable from, if not irreconcilable with, Casey. Most seriously, Roberts denied the central premise of Whole Woman’s Health
that requires “courts ‘to weigh the law’s asserted benefits against the
burdens it imposes on abortion access.’”349 Labeling such analysis a
kind of “balancing test” that makes “‘equality of treatment . . . impossible to achieve,’”350 Roberts found that test to be without meaning
and utterly inconsistent with Casey. 351 Instead, the Chief Justice reframed Casey as a case requiring only that a Court determine whether
the law places a substantial obstacle in the path of a person choosing

342. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
343. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2141–42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
344. Id. at 2133 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“I joined the dissent in Whole Woman’s
Health and continue to believe that the case was wrongly decided.”).
345. Id. at 2141–42.
346. Id. at 2134 (quoting Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1405 (2020)).
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 2135 (disputing the plurality’s reading of Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016)).
350. Id. at 2135 (quoting Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1182 (1989)).
351. See id. at 2139.
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to obtain an abortion.352 By adopting a legal rule consistent with the
June Medical dissenters—indeed, one that does not require courts to
examine whether abortion regulations provide actual benefits—Roberts signaled that he is prepared to join his (now) five more conservative colleagues the next time around, 353 upholding abortion restrictions that provide no health benefits while simultaneously
restricting abortion access.354
2. Miranda Rights
Similar to June Medical, the Court in Berghuis v. Thompkins 355
claimed to reaffirm the constitutional right at issue while altering the
legal framework in a way that significantly undermined its practical
significance. Unlike the non-retrogression-based rationale used to uphold the validity of Miranda rights in Dickerson v. United States,356 the
Thompkins Court weakened Miranda by reading in the requirement
that criminal suspects affirmatively state their intent to remain silent357—something Miranda never required.
In Thompkins, the police placed the defendant into custody as a
suspect in a fatal shooting.358 While in custody, the police provided
Thompkins with a waiver form that listed his Miranda rights and
warnings. 359 Thompkins declined to sign the waiver form and was
largely silent for nearly three hours of intense custodial interrogation. 360 After three hours of fruitless probing, police interrogators
asked him, “Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that boy
352. Id. at 2136.
353. And Roberts may have signaled an openness to overturning Casey all together.
While conceding that Casey’s undue burden standard governed the Court’s review of
abortion restrictions in June, he openly suggested, if not invited, a frontal challenge to
Casey by noting that “[n]either party . . . asked us to reassess the constitutional validity
of that standard,” something he impliedly seemed open to reviewing in the future. Id.
at 2135.
354. During the Dobbs oral argument, see supra note 2, Chief Justice Roberts appeared to suggest that Mississippi’s fifteen-week abortion ban was supportable under
current abortion jurisprudence. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 39–40, 53–54, 67–
68, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021) (No. 19-1392) (intimating that fifteen weeks is an “appropriate line” that preserves the “fair choice” to
terminate a pregnancy under existing precedents notwithstanding the challenged
law’s failure to preserve the right to pre-viability abortions).
355. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010).
356. See supra Part II.E.2.
357. Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 388–89.
358. Id. at 374.
359. Id. at 374–75.
360. Id. at 375–76.
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down?” Thompkins replied “yes.”361 Despite his refusal to expressly
waive his Miranda rights and his near silence in the face of a threehour interrogation, Thompkins’s one-word response was admitted
into evidence and used against him at trial, where he was subsequently convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.362 The Court affirmed the interrogation and
the conviction.363
Justice Kennedy, writing for a 5-4 majority, stated that the Court
was reaffirming Miranda’s core ruling.364 However, in significantly expanding the implied waiver doctrine, the Thompkins Court “turn[ed]
Miranda upside down” and arrived at result that is contrary to a fair
reading of Miranda.365 Under Miranda, an interrogation must cease if
an individual held in custody “indicates in any manner . . . that he
wishes to remain silent” or “states that he wants an attorney.”366 The
majority never mentioned the important “indicates in any manner”
language from Miranda. Instead, in dramatically reshaping the practical significance of the Miranda right to remain silent, the Court found
that suspects held in custody must speak to claim their right to silence.367 Indeed, Thompkins’s statements seem to be clearly inadmissible under the original Miranda standard.368 Through this decision,
the Court diluted a significant constitutional right while claiming to

361. Id. at 376.
362. Id. at 378.
363. Id. at 389–91.
364. Id. at 383 (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443–44 (2000)).
365. Id. at 412 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Charles Weisselberg & Stephanos Bibas, The Right to Remain Silent, 159 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 69, 70 (2010) (featuring
a debate between Professors Weisselberg and Bibas in which the former argues that
Thompkins “fully undermined Miranda’s safeguards and will significantly alter police
practices”).
366. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473–74 (1966) (emphasis added).
367. See Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 409 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Indeed, Miranda
contemplated the exact question at issue in Thompkins over the admissibility of statements obtained after lengthy interrogation, stating, “the fact of lengthy interrogation
. . . before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive
his rights.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. The Court explained that “the fact that the individual eventually made a statement is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him to do so” and that this “is inconsistent with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of the privilege.” Thompkins, 560
U.S. at 396–97 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476).
368. See Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 412 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court and Criminal Procedure at Age Five, 43 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 13, 19 (2010) (“It is impossible to reconcile the Supreme Court’s decision in
Berghuis v. Thompkins with Miranda v. Arizona.”).
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uphold it—as it had done in June Medical.369 As the next section will
demonstrate, the Court has acted similarly in the statutory voting
rights context.
B. NON-RETROGRESSION AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
Counterintuitively, non-retrogression has lost significant footholds in its native statutory voting rights context, even while expanding its trans-substantive footprint across the rest of the rights landscape. Shelby County v. Holder illustrates this incongruity.370 When the
Court invalidated the preclearance formula under Section 4 of the
VRA,371 it mooted Section 5 preclearance—the very part of the Act the
Court had interpreted as proscribing “retrogression” in the effective
enfranchisement of racial minorities,372 and which had in turn vaulted
the term “non-retrogression” into the mainstream of voting rights literature. 373 Hence, while most commentators of Shelby County have
panned the decision as an unprincipled interpretation of Congress’s
power under the Fourteenth Amendment,374 the decision is equally
incorrect for undermining the norm of constitutional non-retrogression that has become a fixture of constitutional rights doctrines.
As it defanged statutory non-retrogression, Shelby County fell below the narrower construction of constitutional non-retrogression—
turning the principle on its head. If, as Jeffries and Levinson explain,375
369. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Pavan v. Smith further demonstrates how one can
pay lip service to precedent while plotting its effective destruction. 137 S. Ct. 2075
(2017). In a straightforward application of the same-sex marriage right announced in
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), Pavan invalidated an Arkansas law that (1)
allowed state officials to omit birth mothers’ female spouses from the birth certificates
of children conceived through anonymous sperm donation but (2) required the inclusion of identically situated male spouses. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078. In dissent, Justice
Gorsuch wrote that Obergefell, “[t]o be sure,” requires states to recognize same-sex
marriages. Id. at 2079. But he expressed befuddlement at how a “birth registration regime based on biology” could be read to offend that requirement, given that “rational
reasons exist” for such a framework. Id. It therefore appears that Gorsuch would interpret Obergefell’s prohibition on differential access to the “constellation of benefits that
the States have linked to marriage” as leaving room for discrimination grounded in
legislators’ notions of biology. Obergefell, 576 at 670, 675–76. This enormous carveout,
while purportedly consistent with settled precedent, would deprive Obergefell of much
of its equalizing power.
370. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
371. Id. at 530, 542–57.
372. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
373. See supra Part I.A.
374. See, e.g., Dawn Johnsen, Windsor, Shelby County, and the Demise of Originalism: A Personal Account, 89 IND. L.J. 3, 5–6, 20–24 (2014).
375. See infra notes 390–406 and accompanying text.
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non-retrogression activates when a group already enjoying judicial
solicitude loses a protected interest via a “higher” level of political process than was used to grant the interest in the first place, Congress had
flipped the script under the VRA by more fully enforcing voting
rights—not rescinding them. Just a few years prior, Congress had
reauthorized the preclearance formula, in part because “[v]olumes of
evidence supported Congress’s determination that the prospect of retrogression was real.”376 Nevertheless, in the face of that policy judgment—one declared at the same (statutory) level of political power as
the original VRA—the Court elevated its own reading of the factual
record over Congress’s and struck the VRA down377—“open[ing] the
floodgates” to future attempts to rescind voting rights.378 Not only has
this aspect of Shelby County been criticized as “hardly . . . an exemplar
of restrained and moderate decisionmaking,”379 but it also highlights
an incongruity between the proliferation of non-retrogression in the
constitutional context and its retrenchment in the statutory domain.
Even more recently, the Court in Brnovich v. Democratic National
Committee380 picked up where Shelby County left off, facilitating the
retrogression of voting rights. Brnovich, among the wave of postShelby County cases now compelled to be brought under the more defendant-friendly Section 2 of the VRA, tasked the Court with evaluating the (statutory) lawfulness of two restrictive voting measures enacted in Arizona—a state previously subject to the now-discarded
376. Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 590 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Throwing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory
changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.”).
377. Id. at 553–54 (majority opinion) (“Congress compiled thousands of pages of
evidence before reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act. The court below and the parties
have debated what that record shows—they have gone back and forth about whether
to compare covered to noncovered jurisdictions as blocks, how to disaggregate the
data State by State, how to weigh § 2 cases as evidence of ongoing discrimination, and
whether to consider evidence not before Congress, among other issues. Regardless of
how to look at the record, however, no one can fairly say that it shows anything approaching the ‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’ ‘widespread,’ and ‘rampant’ discrimination that
faced Congress in 1965, and that clearly distinguished the covered jurisdictions from
the rest of the Nation at that time.” (internal citations omitted)).
378. See The Effects of Shelby County v. Holder, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Aug. 6,
2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/effects-shelby
-county-v-holder [https://perma.cc/MV4X-AJLN] (“The effects were immediate.
Within 24 hours of the ruling, Texas announced that it would implement a strict photo
ID law. Two other states, Mississippi and Alabama, also began to enforce photo ID laws
that had previously been barred because of federal preclearance.”).
379. Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 587 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
380. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021).
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VRA preclearance requirements.381 Writing for the Court, Justice Alito
emphasized the state’s right to prioritize interests other than voting
rights through what he characterized as “modest” and “small” burdens
on ballot access, 382 despite evidence that both policies in question
“disproportionately affect minority citizens’ opportunity to vote.”383
The specific so-called state interest in question here: the familiar ballot-access boogieman of voter fraud.384
The Court, however, was apparently disinclined to treat the prospect of voter fraud with the same skepticism it mustered for plaintiff’s disparate impact evidence. As Justice Kagan noted in dissent, not
only did the majority’s approach permit states to “not even show that
the discriminatory rule it enacted is necessary to prevent the fraud it
purports to fear,”385 but—as the majority readily conceded—it also
invited them to trumpet anti-fraud rationales without evidence of any
actual threat of fraud.386 In doing so, the Court further distanced its
contemporary voting rights doctrine from its non-retrogression origins, arming states increasingly inclined387 to slash voting rights with
a readymade VRA alibi, and further eroding the non-retrogression
principles that once formed the bedrock of post-Civil Rights Movement voting rights jurisprudence.
If Shelby County and Brnovich represented an intersection of nonretrogression’s past and present, they also, fittingly enough, left the
Court at something of a crossroads. Even as the Court has allowed itself to graze further afield from non-retrogression’s roots, contemporary forces have aligned to underscore non-retrogression’s importance—and the perils its absence could pose. Part IV will explore

381. Id. at 2370 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
382. Id. at 2344 (majority opinion).
383. Id. at 2366 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
384. Id. at 2365 (“Throughout American history, election officials have asserted
anti-fraud interests in using voter suppression laws.”).
385. Id. at 2372.
386. Id. at 2348 (majority opinion); see also Richard L. Hasen, Opinion, The Supreme Court Is Putting Democracy at Risk, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2021), https://www
.nytimes.com/2021/07/01/opinion/supreme-court-rulings-arizona-california.html
[https://perma.cc/5P3M-6XT9] (“Thanks to Brnovich, a state can now assert an interest in preventing fraud to justify a law without proving that fraud is actually a serious
risk, but at the same time, minority voters have a high burden: They must show that
the state has imposed more than the ‘usual burdens of voting.’”).
387. See Voting Laws Roundup: December 2021, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Dec. 21,
2021),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws
-roundup-december-2021 [https://perma.cc/S9TU-CGHM] (“Between January 1 and
December 7[, 2021], at least 19 states enacted 34 laws restricting access to voting.”).
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non-retrogression’s modern frontiers, highlighting prominent examples of rights at risk of unraveling, and discussing the protective role
an unshackled non-retrogression could play in the battles to come.
IV. NON-RETROGRESSION’S MOMENT
The dynamic of non-retrogression just analyzed has numerous
implications. First, a reconsideration of the early scholarly misgivings
over non-retrogression seems warranted, as the caselaw has
stretched well beyond the overly rigid, formulaic conceptions in the
early literature, rendering the initial, more skeptical takes on non-retrogression inaccurate on both descriptive and normative grounds.
Second, non-retrogression could influence new settings, including
constitutional voting rights battles where a court’s application of nonretrogression principles could make a big difference in future disputes. Finally, while non-retrogression has a progressive valence
when the Court drifts rightward, it is not a one-way ratchet and could
prevent a future liberal court from rescinding conservative rights.
A. UNSHACKLING NON-RETROGRESSION
The current literature around non-retrogression has tethered it
to a concept that may incompletely describe the Court’s objectives
outside the statutory Section 5 VRA context. For their part, Jeffries and
Levinson begin their account with Beer’s statutory application of the
non-retrogression principle under the VRA. 388 While noting this
standard’s “shortcomings”—particularly, the seeming arbitrariness of
forbidding only new instances of old “evils”—they conclude that the
VRA’s overriding objective of “increasing minority political power”
supplies it with sufficient logic and coherence.389
The only constitutional non-retrogression cases that Jeffries and
Levinson find to be comparably grounded in some “substantive foundation”390 are Reitman v. Mulkey,391 Hunter v. Erickson,392 and Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1.393 In Reitman, the Court invalidated a California voter initiative that, by establishing a state
388. See Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 14, at 1213–15. Although they mention
federal environmental law’s “nondegredation” principle in passing, their focus is the
non-retrogression standard embedded in VRA Section 5. Id. at 1215 n.10.
389. Id. at 1214.
390. Id. at 1226.
391. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
392. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
393. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
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constitutional right to engage in housing discrimination, repealed recently enacted fair housing laws and prohibited their reenactment.394
In Hunter, a voter-driven amendment to the Akron city charter met
the same fate, having invalidated all existing fair housing ordinances
in the city and requiring referendum approval of new ones.395 And in
Seattle, the Court invalidated a Washington state voter initiative prohibiting the kind of busing program that a Seattle school district had
recently initiated to unwind de facto segregation.396
Jeffries and Levinson identify an unspoken 397 principle of nonretrogression as the common thread connecting these cases,398 but it
is a much narrower version of the principle than Section 5 of the VRA
requires—and one whose legitimacy is limited to the singular context
of race.399 In each case, the Court contrasted “mere”400 or “simple”401
repeal of a gratuitous substantive entitlement with what Jeffries and
Levinson describe as a “retreat to a higher and presumably less favorable level of political decision.”402 Only the latter mode of rollback, and
specifically the imposition of “special burdens . . . within the governmental process,”403 raised constitutional concerns.404 In short, under
Jeffries and Levinson’s generally disapproving405 construction of non394. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 374, 380–81.
395. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 386–87, 393.
396. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 461–64, 487.
397. See Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 14, at 1215 (“In each of these cases, nonretrogression was the operative rule; yet in each the Court tried to find some other
basis for decision.”).
398. Id. at 1217 (“In each of these cases, the trigger of unconstitutionality was retrogression . . . .”).
399. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
400. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 376 (1967); Hunter, 393 U.S. at 390
n.5.
401. See, e.g., Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 485 n.29.
402. Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 14, at 1217.
403. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969). The unedited quote refers exclusively to racial minorities, but, as noted supra at note 158, Justice White suggested
broader application by noting further that “[a] State may no more disadvantage any
particular group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may
dilute any person’s vote or give any group a smaller representation than another of
comparable size.” Id. at 393 (emphasis added).
404. Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 14, at 1217–18 (“In a sense, these cases involve
double retrogression: first, withdrawal of some substantive entitlement (such as fair
housing protections), and second, retreat to a higher and presumably less favorable
level of political decision. Although these two levels of retrogression occurred in tandem, it apparently was the second that the Supreme Court found so objectionable.”).
405. Jeffries and Levinson levy a number of criticisms at non-retrogression, as they
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retrogression, a state, having stuck its foot forward, may pull it back,
but it may not step onto a higher political plane and, from that elevated platform, leap back in the other direction.406
However, it is unclear whether or how the Court’s construction
of statutory retrogression adequately grounds an understanding of
the “free-standing procedural principle”407 that Jeffries and Levinson
deride. Notably, none of the cases that Jeffries and Levinson include in
the Court’s emerging non-retrogression canon cite Beer explicitly408—
indeed, they do not mention “retrogression” in any form—and neither
do any of the cases that this Article stirs into the mix. “Non-retrogression” is a name with different meanings—one in the narrow, VRA context, and another the constitutional and quasi-constitutional contexts
described in this Article. And the latter definition—the basis of this
Article—deserves more sympathetic treatment than what the conventional literature currently allows.
Moreover, and more generally, the few scholars who have engaged with non-retrogression have tended to discard its proceduralist
had constructed it. First, as a general matter, non-retrogression “does not cure existing
evils; it only forbids new ones.” Id. at 1214. Second, it yields, at best, incoherent results—a court may treat the same action as “lawful in one county but not in its neighbor” or arbitrarily anoint “a particular state of affairs as a baseline and then insist[]
that departure from that baseline is somehow unconstitutional”—and, at worst, “constitutionally perverse” results where government attempts to retreat from constitutionally suspect policies themselves become constitutionally suspect. Id. at 1214, 1225–
26, 1234. Third, they note that, carried to its logical end, the focus on operation has the
unworkable result of rendering all higher-level governmental decisions “constitutionally suspect.” Id. at 1220–21 (citing subsequent Supreme Court precedent indicating
that the Justices “did not really mean” this). And further, by allowing discriminatory
motive to invalidate even same-level repeals, the analysis can turn on “paper thin” distinctions of what constitutes sufficient discriminatory intent. Id. at 1218–19. Finally,
the authors stress that non-retrogression is a disingenuous attempt to smuggle a substantive agenda through the courts under procedural guise. Id. at 1235.
406. See supra note 404 and accompanying text.
407. Id. at 1234.
408. Jeffries and Levinson’s critique is grounded in the narrow conception based
on the Court’s holding in Beer v. United States, in which the Court upheld a redistricting
plan for the city of New Orleans that appeared likely to increase Black representation
on the city council, though less dramatically than would have been possible under alternative maps. 425 U.S. 130, 135–37, 141–42 (1976) (noting that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act forbids any “retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise”). Because the plan was at
least minimally “ameliorative,” it could not be said to dilute or abridge the right to vote
on account of race. Id. at 141. This purely directional understanding of Section 5 was
controversial from the outset—Justice Marshall’s Beer dissent noted that “[s]ome
changes just do not lend themselves to comparison in positive or negative terms”—but
for better or worse it has survived. Id. at 153 n.12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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and institutionalist trappings409 as the stalking horse for the substantive agenda of an activist Court.410 Jeffries and Levinson’s critique of
the reasoning behind cases like Romer is illustrative. Romer’s facts
were “precisely analogous to the Reitman line of cases”—except that
sexual orientation was in issue instead of race, a distinction that Jeffries and Levinson liken to “Mount Everest.”411 Indeed, only ten years
before Romer, in Bowers v. Hardwick,412 the Court had declined to recognize the right to consensual same-sex sexual activity,413 which Jeffries and Levinson understood to render sexual orientation “constitutionally insignificant.”414 A second-order effect, in their view, should
have been to immunize anti-gay state action against a non-retrogression challenge; without a “substantive foundation” comparable to the
race-equality mandate underlying Reitman and Seattle, “there is no
way to tell the difference between progress and regress. One direction
is as good as another.”415 Nonetheless, the Court invalidated Amendment 2 on grounds that Jeffries and Levinson interpret as extending
“the Hunter ban on higher-level repeals to laws protecting homosexuals.”416 While noting the susceptibility of Justice Kennedy’s opinion to
multiple readings,417 they construe his silence on Bowers to disclaim a

409. See Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 14, at 1234.
410. See id. at 1240. From discrete uses of statutory non-retrogression that they
deem sensible, see id. at 1213–15, Jeffries and Levinson derive the broad conclusion
that non-retrogression only makes sense when some “authoritative institution has declared (or everyone has agreed upon) a substantive goal.” Id. at 1215 (“Ratcheting
change in one direction is a coherent legal strategy if and only if one knows which way
to go.”). Although they grudgingly concede that the first batch of Supreme Court cases
to flirt with a constitutional theory of non-retrogression met this standard, they argue
that the doctrine soon thereafter became unmoored from any identifiable “normative
premise,” id. at 1226–28, which led to “truly incoherent” consequences. Id. at 1223.
411. Id. at 1226.
412. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
413. Id. at 192 (refusing to recognize “a fundamental right [of] homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy”).
414. Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 14, at 1226. They consider and reject attempts
to reconcile Bowers and Romer along conduct-status lines, not least because such reconciliation “reduces Romer to triviality.” Id. at 1229 (“We think it unlikely that . . . rewriting Amendment 2 to bar special protection for persons who have engaged in homosexual conduct would resolve the deeply-felt antipathies to this provision.”).
415. Id. at 1226–27.
416. Id. at 1229.
417. Id. at 1227–28 (“Any attempt to understand Romer requires some creativity
in reading the Court’s opinion. Our approach is no exception. . . . Justice Kennedy’s
opinion for the Court never pins down precisely what is wrong. At each crucial point,
a vague epithet takes the place of a comprehensible reason . . . .”).
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grant of protected status on the basis of sexual orientation,418 and they
reject an “animus” theory of the case given the evident hostility behind
laws of the kind that Bowers blessed.419 Ultimately, with Bowers still
good law, Jeffries and Levinson feel constrained to read Romer in
terms of Reitman-Hunter-Seattle non-retrogression—an outcome
they deem “hopelessly confused” in the absence of a constitutional
predicate requiring unidirectional movement on LGBTQ rights.420
However incomplete that description of Romer—the actual entitlement trigger entailed both the specific ordinances at issue and an
“emerging tradition” of steadily expanding antidiscrimination protections 421 —Jeffries and Levinson’s traditionalist notion of non-retrogression has the advantage of rendering their claims testable. Allowing that Justice Kennedy’s vision of the “true line of progress”422 might
one day be proven “prophetic,”423 they in effect argue that the ultimate
test of Romer will be its reception in the political culture—specifically,
whether it enjoys the unblemished career of Hunter424 or rather tells
a “cautionary tale” in the manner of Roe v. Wade425 or Furman v. Georgia.426
With the benefit of over twenty years’ hindsight, it is now plain
that Romer has stood the test of time. In fairly rapid succession, the
Court has prohibited anti-sodomy legislation,427 invalidated the exclusion of same-sex couples from the federal definition of marriage,428
and recognized the fundamental right of marriage for same-sex couples429—providing at least a partial answer to Jeffries and Levinson’s
question of whether “the future will reveal the rightness of preserving
418. Id. at 1229.
419. Id. at 1228.
420. Id. at 1230–31.
421. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 628 (1996); see also supra notes 166–71
and accompanying text.
422. Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 14, at 1246 (quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 13 (2d ed. 1978)).
423. Id. at 1245.
424. Id. at 1247 (noting the enactment of “broad prohibitions against private racial
discrimination” in concluding that, “[a]s of this date, Hunter looks like a good bet”).
425. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
426. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). On Roe and Furman, Jeffries and Levinson argue that “hindsight has not been kind to” the Court’s “prediction” that the
country would move “toward acceptance and liberalization of abortion rights and toward disapproval and abolition of the death penalty.” Jeffries & Levinson, supra note
14, at 1247.
427. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
428. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
429. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675–76 (2015).
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antidiscrimination protection for gays and lesbians.”430 And the Court
for better or worse has transplanted Romer’s core insights of government neutrality and respect for equal dignity from the antidiscrimination cases in which it originated to other constitutional arenas, including First Amendment objections to state antidiscrimination laws and
executive branch immigration policy.431
It is important to pin down what the future has revealed, and by
extension the nature of Romer’s vindication. Jeffries and Levinson
would likely argue that the United States was nearer to an “emerging
national consensus”432 on LGBTQ rights than was foreseeable when
they wrote their article—and that Romer therefore joins Reitman,
Hunter, and Seattle as a defensible application of the non-retrogression principle. But if so, they would only be upgrading Romer from
“analytically incoherent[,] substantively pointless,”433 and “hopelessly
confused”434 to a case that “made practical sense.”435 Their critique of
Romer as an “intellectual shell game”436 would remain intact, as would
their broader criticism that non-retrogression “substitute[s] a purportedly positive question—how things used to be or how they will
be—for the normative question of how they should be.”437
430. Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 14, at 1245. Suspect-class status remains elusive, however, meaning that “legally tolerated discrimination against homosexuals
[has not] soon become[] as anachronistic as racial segregation in the Jim Crow South
. . . .” Id.
431. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723–
24 (2018) (invalidating order of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission for lacking “religious neutrality” toward a confectioner that refused to serve a same-sex couple);
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420–23 (2018) (invoking rational basis review to
sustain presidential proclamation restricting U.S. entry to foreign nationals from eight
countries, notwithstanding plaintiffs’ contention that the policy was based on anti-Islamic animus); id. at 2423–24 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (attributing to the majority an
acknowledgement that the proclamation would be invalidated if it failed the Romer
standard and were deemed “inexplicable by anything but animus”) (internal citation
omitted)).
432. Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 14, at 1225 (arguing that cases such as “Reitman and Hunter reflect, and may be thought justified by, an emerging national consensus, codified by federal civil rights statutes banning race discrimination in employment, education, housing, public accommodations, and other ‘private’ settings”); cf.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (recognizing an “emerging awareness” that consenting adult
persons should be left free to make their own decisions about their private sexual
lives).
433. Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 14, at 1215.
434. Id. at 1231.
435. Id. at 1215.
436. Id. at 1236.
437. Id. at 1245.
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This image of non-retrogression as a procedural cloak concealing
grand substantive schemes is difficult to square with Romer’s alleged
resemblance to the Warren-era progressive traditionalists—whose
role as the “midwi[ves] of a utopian future”438 was hardly covert. Jeffries and Levinson by turns criticize Romer for coyly avoiding a definitive statement on Bowers’s continuing effect439 and accuse it of reprising the Warren Court’s alleged over-willingness to “resolve . . .
issues of grand principle.”440 For the latter charge, they rely on Alexander Bickel for the contention that courts should primarily “make
law interstitially by resolving concrete issues of individual justice . . . .”441 But this is arguably what Romer did, because for better or
worse the Court avoided either issuing a pronouncement on fundamental privacy rights or declaring sexual orientation a suspect classification. Instead, it confined itself to the plight of a discrete set of individuals whose newly granted rights had been snatched away in a
manner that not only suggested animus,442 but also placed them at a
marked political disadvantage 443 and undermined their reliance on
progressivism’s onward march.444 Under a properly broad conception
of non-retrogression principles, these interests were worthy of vindication, meaning that the justice of Romer need not turn on whether
and how rapidly “legally tolerated discrimination against homosexuals [is becoming] as anachronistic as racial segregation in the Jim Crow
South.”445 Perhaps Jeffries and Levinson cannot be faulted for failing
to foresee that the “Everest”446-scale difference between LGBTQ rights
and racial-minority rights would soon be reduced to a hillock, but
their overly constricted model of non-retrogression inadequately captures the set of values the doctrine can serve in any substantive context.
Of course, the Court can have independently valid procedural
grounds for delivering an opinion sounding in non-retrogression
themes, while nonetheless being aware of the decision’s potential to
438. Id. at 1246.
439. Id. at 1227 (“Romer did not purport to overrule Bowers. In a remarkable act
of intellectual evasion, the Court did not even cite that decision. If one takes the Court
at its word, Romer leaves Bowers intact.”).
440. Id. at 1246.
441. Id.
442. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
443. Id. at 631.
444. Id. at 627–29.
445. Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 14, at 1245.
446. Id. at 1226.
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reshape history. Jeffries and Levinson’s account of non-retrogression—as “a relatively low-cost way . . . to further social change, allowing the Justices to cast themselves not as revolutionaries, but rather
as ushers or shepherds, intervening only when a state strays from the
path of progress” 447 —is therefore appealing. And the picture they
paint is not necessarily unattractive. For one thing, Jeffries and Levinson themselves claim that they “would cheerfully accept” an interpretation of Romer as having overturned Bowers, as “[i]t is no part of
[their] argument that Bowers was correctly decided.”448 But perhaps
the choice in 1996 was not between non-retrogression and overturning Bowers, but rather between non-retrogression and no remedy
whatsoever. If so, non-retrogression at least had the benefit of buying
a disfavored group some time. From a Bickelian perspective, while
LGBTQ people’s broader political and legal cause was still struggling
to gain momentum, Romer offered protection against at least a subset
of the civic insults that heightened scrutiny or fundamental rights
analysis protect against—namely, arbitrary and/or animus-based
rights rescissions, compounded by disdain for the reliance interests
those rights had engendered. It is not prophecy to believe that such
harms demand redress as they arise, so Jeffries and Levinson’s skepticism that “the Justices are gifted prophets”449 seems inapt. Insofar as
an opinion grounded in principles “contains an implicit prediction”450
about the future, the cost of being wrong will be low. But the cost of
abandoning non-retrogression for lack of a substantive foundation
could be high—especially for classes beset by harms today and who
hope to build a substantive foundation for greater protection in the
future. Particularly in an era of deep judicial skepticism of substantive
equality claims, non-retrogression principles are an indispensable
tool.
B. NON-RETROGRESSION AND VOTING RIGHTS BATTLES
A further question at the intersection of statutory and constitutional non-retrogression is whether the latter could play a role in preserving the status quo around access to the franchise. The dormancy
of Section 5 non-retrogression appears greatly weakened after Shelby
County and is particularly worrisome in light of the current flood of

447.
448.
449.
450.

Id. at 1245.
Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1246.
Id. at 1245.
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proposals to restrict voting access percolating in the states.451 At 440
bills and counting, in forty-nine states, the pending legislation—a reaction to unprecedented voter turnout in the 2020 election—collectively takes aim at vote-by-mail and simplified registration policies,
while aggressively promoting voter ID requirements and voter roll
purges. 452 But, to the extent these changes work a retrogression in
voting power by historically disadvantaged groups, it is conceivable
that mainstream constitutional non-retrogression, if articulated to its
full potential, could compensate for the absence of statutory non-retrogression under Section 5.
A fairly recent Sixth Circuit decision, Obama for America v. Husted,
illustrates how that dynamic might work. 453 In 2005, Ohio adopted
no-fault absentee voting and in-person early voting, in part to avoid
recurrence of the egregiously long wait times that had plagued the
prior year’s general election.454 In the years that followed, Ohioans enthusiastically took up these expanded voting options, submitting approximately 105,000 in-person early ballots in the three days preceding Election Day 2008. 455 Early voting proved disproportionately
popular with women, the elderly, low-income and less educated individuals, and—of critical importance here—African Americans.456 Notwithstanding these democratizing effects, or perhaps because of them,
between 2011 and 2012 Ohio eliminated the ability of non-military
voters to vote in-person during the three days preceding an election
day.457 Against that background, the Sixth Circuit in Obama for America deemed the plaintiffs likely to succeed on their equal protection
challenge and upheld the district court’s preliminary injunction
against the voting-access rollback.458
In thwarting a state’s attempt to rescind a constitutional gratuity,
451. See Voting Laws Roundup: December 2021, supra note 387.
452. Id.
453. Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012).
454. Id. at 426.
455. Id.
456. Id. at 426–27. The cited data on African American voters is primarily confined
to Cuyahoga and Franklin Counties—home to Cleveland and Columbus, and Ohio’s two
most populous counties. See id. at 440–41 (White, J., concurring).
457. Id. at 427 (majority opinion). The state of affairs challenged in Obama for
America was the output of a convoluted series of events: omnibus revisions to Ohio’s
election laws, technical corrections of the omnibus bill, a petition placing the omnibus
bill’s repeal on the 2012 ballot, legislative repeal of the omnibus bill but not of its technical fixes, and the secretary of state’s interpretation of the contradictory muddle that
remained. Id.
458. Id. at 436–37.
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Obama for America had a distinct non-retrogression flavor.459 But the
variety of non-retrogression it espoused was notably “selective,”460 as
Edward Foley has explained: “Rollback for all voters would be okay.
Expansion of extra opportunities for military voters, without any rollback for non-military voters, would seemingly also be okay. . . . It is
keeping the opportunities the same for military voters, while cutting
back those opportunities for everyone else, that the majority cannot
accept.”461 Foley is skeptical that a broader non-retrogression principle might apply to election law,462 a perspective that other scholars
share.463 So it might appear that state legislators hoping to limit access
to the polls need not worry about non-retrogression, provided they
avoid the kind of differential rollback that Ohio attempted to implement.
On the other hand, Judge White’s concurrence in Obama for America reveals how a reliance-inflected version of the non-retrogression
principle can be positioned as a bulwark against a much broader
swath of voting-rights rescissions.464 After rejecting an equal-convenience voting right in the abstract, Judge White insisted that the condition of Ohio’s non-military voters not be “divorced from reality”—
459. This is particularly true of the district court’s approach to the case: “‘[I]n-person early voting’ is a voting term that had included the right to vote in person through
the Monday before Election Day, and, now, thousands of voters who would have voted
during those three days will not be able to exercise their right to cast a vote in person.”
Obama for Am. v. Husted, 888 F. Supp. 2d 897, 907 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (emphasis removed). But as Edward Foley notes, the Sixth Circuit “essentially embraced” the district court’s reasoning. Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, 81 GEO.
WASH L. REV. 1836, 1845 (2013).
460. Foley, supra note 459, at 1846; see also Obama for Am., 888 F. Supp. 2d at 910
(“[W]here the State has authorized in-person early voting through the Monday before
Election Day for all voters, ‘the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of another.’” (emphasis removed) (quoting
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000))).
461. Foley, supra note 459, at 1846.
462. See Edward B. Foley, Two Big Cases Ready for Major Appellate Rulings, ELECTION L. @ MORITZ (Sept. 30, 2012), https://web.archive.org/web/20121010213551/
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/index.php?ID=9779 (“[T]he revocation of previously available opportunities may make no difference if a State was not
obligated to grant those opportunities in the first place, and the State has simply returned to a situation it was entitled to be in initially.”).
463. See Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, 81 GEO. WASH L. REV. 1865, 1881 (2013) (“Nor was there any
authority [pre-Obama for America] for the idea that once a state enacted a period of
early voting, the Constitution would bar the state from contracting it. No such ‘nonretrogression’ principle applied to the routine choices each jurisdiction makes when it
comes to the mechanics and details of voting.”).
464. Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 437–38 (6th Cir. 2012).
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namely, that voting in Ohio had since 2005 featured “extended in-person absentee-voting opportunities [responsive to the 2004 debacle],
the substantial exercise of that right, and the boards of Ohio’s largest
counties’ reliance on the availability of such voting.” 465 Within that
specific factual context, the state’s “eleventh-hour changes” threatened at least two reliance interests: the interest of county election
boards that had not had adequate time to prepare for an Election-Day
crush, and the interest of those voters who for the better part of a decade had relied on extended poll access “for the exercise of their franchise.”466 Judge White concluded that the latter concern, lest courts
“ignore reality,” is “properly considered” under the applicable Supreme Court doctrine,467 which the Court has recognized to be a “flexible standard” 468 requiring courts to make “hard judgment[s]” 469
where voting rights and state interests clash. Particularly given her
acknowledgment that this burden would be disproportionately borne
by Ohio’s African American voters, Judge White’s reasoning suggests
an approach to voting-rights litigation that might resonate with the
Supreme Court’s demonstrated concern for non-retrogression principles.470 While by no means an adequate substitute for Section 5, constitutional non-retrogression provides a framework for voters whose
reliance interests in preexisting voting-access rights are subject to
revocation. Of course, given the Roberts Court’s most recent approaches to voting rights more generally,471 it is unlikely that the current Court would incorporate Obama for America’s non-retrogression
465. Id. at 441.
466. Id. at 441–42.
467. Id. at 442. The modern constitutional standard for assessing restrictions on
voting rights and ballot access—so-called Anderson-Burdick balancing—weighs “the
character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments . . . against the precise interests put forward by the State as
justifications for the burden . . . taking into consideration the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.” See Burdick v. Takushi, 504
U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (internal quotation marks removed) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788–89 (1983)). More specifically, the extent of the burden determines “the rigorousness of [the Court’s] inquiry,” id. at 434, with “severe” restrictions triggering strict scrutiny, id. at 434 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279,
289 (1992)), and “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” requiring only heightened review, id. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788).
468. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
469. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008).
470. Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 440 (noting studies indicating the disproportionate reliance interests of African American voters in Cuyahoga and Franklin Counties,
and the likely disproportionate impact of rollback).
471. See supra notes 370–87 and accompanying text.
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analysis when evaluating constitutional challenges to the right to
vote.472
C. NON-RETROGRESSION AND CONSERVATIVE RIGHTS
Non-retrogression, in theory, could guard against the revocation
of rights no matter the rights’ political hue. For example, in the event
that the Court’s center of gravity one day shifts back in a leftward direction, conservatives will argue that non-retrogression should entrench the gun rights regime that the Court created in District of Columbia v. Heller. 473 Heller’s endorsement of an individual right to
possess handguns in the home for self-defense purposes474—as distinct from a right tethered to militia service—was arguably no less
novel than Roe’s declaration of a right to terminate one’s pregnancy.475
And it is unlikely that many liberal-leaning prospective Justices would
have signed onto Heller’s reasoning had they been on the Court in
2008.476 Nonetheless, an argument can be made that, in the intervening years, an evidently growing number of Americans have “made

472. Not only did the Brnovich Court rebuff any mention of non-retrogression in
the context of Section 2 of the VRA, see supra notes 380–87 and accompanying text, but
the Court in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board—the Court’s most recent application of Anderson-Burdick balancing—failed to incorporate a non-retrogression analysis, instead focusing on the relative burdens imposed by Indiana’s voter ID law as
compared to the state’s claimed need to stamp out in-person voter fraud. Crawford,
553 U.S. at 198–200.
473. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
474. Id. at 635 (invalidating the District of Columbia’s ban on handgun possession
in the home under the Second Amendment). Two years later, the Court confirmed that
the right announced in Heller applies against the states by way of the Fourteenth
Amendment. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
475. See John Paul Stevens, The Supreme Court’s Worst Decision of My Tenure, ATLANTIC (May 14, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/john
-paul-stevens-court-failed-gun-control/587272
[https://perma.cc/PK28-PV3Q]
(“Throughout most of American history there was no federal objection to laws regulating the civilian use of firearms. When I joined the Supreme Court in 1975, both state
and federal judges accepted the Court’s unanimous decision in United States v. Miller
as having established that the Second Amendment’s protection of the right to bear
arms was possessed only by members of the militia and applied only to weapons used
by the militia.”).
476. See id. (describing Heller as “unquestionably the most clearly incorrect decision that the Supreme Court announced during my tenure on the bench”); Adam Winkler, The Court After Scalia: Would a Liberal Supreme Court Overturn Heller?, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/09/the-court-after
-scalia-would-a-liberal-supreme-court-overturn-heller
[https://perma.cc/JU4D
-BE8P] (placing Heller “near the top of the list of Roberts Court decisions [many liberals] would like to see reversed”).
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choices that define their views of themselves and their places in society in reliance on the availability of”477 firearms. Already by 2017, half
of American gun owners considered their weapons to be important to
their sense of identity, with nearly three-quarters describing the right
to bear arms as essential to their sense of freedom. 478 Against that
backdrop, the year 2020 witnessed a massive surge in gun purchases
by first-time buyers—including, ominously, many self-professed
“anti-gun” people who felt compelled to arm themselves.479 Particularly if, as seems likely, the Court is poised to extend Heller to curtail
the regulation of firearms carried outside the home, 480 a future liberal-majority Court would encounter a country awash in guns 481 —
and a populace arguably accustomed to the easy exercise of their newfound Second Amendment rights.482 In view of the reliance interests
engendered by such an atmosphere, non-retrogression principles
could impede a future Court’s desire to bless the rescission of rights
granted by Heller and its progeny.

477. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
478. Kim Parker, Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Ruth Igielnik, J. Baxter Oliphant &
Anna Brown, America’s Complex Relationship with Guns: An In-Depth Look at the Attitudes and Experiences of U.S. Adults, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 20, 2017),
https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2017/06/22/guns-and-daily-life
-identity-experiences-activities-and-involvement [https://perma.cc/5LYE-C2YZ]. Additionally, in a sign of the depth of social connection that gun ownership provides,
eighty-seven percent of gun owners reported being friends with more than a few fellow gun owners. Id.
479. Marc Fisher, Miranda Green, Kelly Glass & Andrea Eger, ‘Fear on Top of Fear’:
Why Anti-Gun Americans Joined the Wave of New Gun Owners, WASH. POST (July 10,
2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/interactive/2021/anti-gun-gun
-owners/ [https://perma.cc/G993-9L3J] (reporting that first-time buyers accounted
for between one- and two-fifths of overall gun sales in 2020, contributing to a seven
percent spike in the overall rate of gun ownership—“the biggest jump in recent decades”). The Washington Post quoted one gun dealer as saying, “One lady came in here
in tears, with her teenagers, and she said, ‘This goes against everything I believe in, but
I need my family to learn how to protect themselves.’” Id.
480. See Adam Liptak, Justices’ Questions Suggest New York Gun Control Law Is Unlikely to Survive, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/11/03/us/politics/supreme-court-guns-second-amendment.html
[https://
perma.cc/C79V- VWSJ].
481. See Henry Grabar, You Can’t Have an Open-Carry Democracy, SLATE (Jan. 13,
2021), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/01/guns-capitol-riot-trump-crisis
.html [https://perma.cc/H36Z-J6JR] (“For a decade, we’ve been slowly adjusting to the
new role of guns in public life. We’ve redesigned schools, installed metal detectors at
every theater and arena, and endured horrific massacres . . . .”).
482. See id. (decrying the armed show of force against Michigan’s COVID-19 emergency measures as proof of the “oxymoron of open-carry democracy”).
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CONCLUSION
Non-retrogression has assumed an unusual, and in some ways
paradoxical, position among constitutional forces—having garnered
significant scholarly treatment in the narrow voting rights context
while escaping the attention of all but a small few in the broader constitutional context. Even among those small few, and particularly
among those who first undertook to articulate the principle’s role beyond voting rights, there have perhaps been more cynics than believers. But scholarly efforts in the 1990s to cabin non-retrogression’s descriptive and normative potential have proven premature:
subsequent case law has catapulted non-retrogression well beyond
the limited confines imagined by the principle’s initial, reluctant heralds.
These recent doctrinal developments have joined forces with
other longstanding jurisprudential traditions and bedrock constitutional concepts to substantiate a modern non-retrogression principle
that is divorced from any particular context while also eminently applicable to one rather urgent context: projecting just how far the retooled Court will go in rescinding rights. It injects perhaps a dash of
optimism into what, for many, is an understandably worrisome outlook, suggesting that the new Court, no matter how substantively hostile to rights-affirming rulings of prior Courts it can be, may at times
be more likely to conform to those decisions than ordinarily believed—depending, of course, on how far it ultimately strays from its
predecessors’ commitment to non-retrogression. In the meantime, the
question remains whether and to what extent the Court will allow itself to be guided by its own longstanding model of non-retrogression,
and where, by contrast, it will be satisfied greenlighting the recission
of those rights that hang in the balance.

